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“To their supporters, whistleblowers are nothing short  
of heroes who risk their lives or careers for the public  
good.  On the other hand, critics view whistleblowers as 
‘snitches,’ ‘stool pigeons,’ or ‘industrial spies’ . . . .”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Good cop, bad cop” is an interrogation or negotiation 
strategy whereby one person is antagonistic and overtly 
unsympathetic and his or her colleague is excessively friendly and 
supportive.2  While the “good cop, bad cop” routine is usually 
performed by two or more parties, in-house counsel often have to 
carry out both functions, “good cop” and “bad cop,” in their 
relationship with their companies.3  The in-house counsel “good 
cop” seeks to please the organizational actors, coordinates with its 
business purpose, and works to meet operational needs from the 
legal perspective.  In-house counsel act as the “good cop” in their 
 
 1. Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts 
Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of 
Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 316 (1993) (citation omitted) (examining 
whistleblower law in South Dakota). 
 2. See David Bosworth, United States v. Patane: The Supreme Court’s Continued 
Assault on Miranda, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1499, 1501 n.14 (2005) (interrogation 
tactic); Alain Burrese, Strategy vs. Tactics, MONT. LAW., Feb. 2007, at 26, 26, available 
at http://www.montanabar.org/associations/7121/feb2007screen.pdf 
(negotiation tactic). 
 3. For purposes of this article, “in-house counsel” refers to any attorney who 
is an employee of a company or organization (other than a law firm)—including 
attorneys in law departments or in any business lines—and the company or 
organization (or any segment thereof) is said attorney’s sole client.  For a 
definition of “outside attorney” or “outside counsel,” see infra Part III.A 
(comparing the roles of in-house counsel and outside attorneys) and infra note 83 
(defining outside attorney). 
2
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roles as: gatekeeper;4 zealous advocate;5 business executive and 
strategist;6 and confidential counselor.7  Conversely, the in-house 
counsel “bad cop” seeks to limit organizational and employee 
misconduct, maintain legal compliance, and, arguably, uphold 
ethical standards.  In-house counsel act as the “bad cop” in their 
roles as: nonparticipant in illegal activity;8 compliance facilitator;9 
and potential whistleblower.10 
 
 4. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 
92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 328 (2007) (“Gatekeepers include auditors and attorneys, 
who work directly with and essentially inside the enterprise.”); Ronald J. Gilson, 
The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 
883 (1990) (“[In a] well-functioning gatekeeper regime . . . . [w]rongdoing is 
prevented, rather than punished after the fact . . . .”). 
 5. See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2008) (describing the lawyer’s 
role as “zealous advocate”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007) (“As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system.”).  The obligation of zealous representation applies not only in 
the litigation context, but also when an attorney is advising or counseling a client 
in any legal matter.  MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 69 (4th ed. 2010) (“[I]t is not just the client currently in litigation 
who may both require and be entitled to ‘warm zeal in the maintenance and 
defense of his rights.’”). 
 6. See Nandu Machiraju, When Hot Docs Set Your Company on Fire: Expanding 
the Role of the General Counsel to Manage Antitrust Risk, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 997, 
1004–07 (2009) (asserting that a general counsel’s role should not be limited to 
legal advice; arguing that a general counsel should have some duties similar to 
“other functional chief executives,” including increased involvement in strategic 
decision-making). 
 7. Robert J. Jossen, Dealing with the Lawyer’s Responsibilities Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: Ethical Dilemmas and Practical Considerations, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
COURSE OF STUDY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 667, 687 
(2003) (“Lawyers play a crucial role in contributing to corporate compliance as 
confidential counselors.”); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007) 
(stating that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client,” except in limited prescribed circumstances); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008) (stating that, except under expressly stated 
circumstances, “a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client”). 
 8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); accord MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) 
(2008). 
 9. Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting 
Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1012 (2007) 
(“[T]he general counsel and other in-house lawyers play a major role in ensuring 
legal compliance throughout the entity.”). 
 10. See Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on 
Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 711 (1981) (discussing the “lawyer’s role as 
whistleblower”). 
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It is this dual nature that makes the job of the in-house counsel 
so complex.  It is also this dual nature that makes attorney-
whistleblower lawsuits, and the underlying public policy interests, 
difficult to resolve.  Whistleblower claims by in-house counsel 
implicate legal doctrines of employment law and ethical obligations 
of client confidentiality, as well as practical and moral constraints 
that attorneys encounter in their decision-making process. 
This article begins by describing the policy rationales and 
sources of whistleblower law.11  It continues with an explanation of 
the unique issues faced by in-house counsel and discusses Kidwell v. 
Sybaritic, Inc.,12 which involved an in-house attorney’s claim for 
whistleblower protection.13  Next, it analyzes and debates the two 
main issues raised by Kidwell: the job duty exception from 
whistleblower protection and the client confidentiality rule for 
attorney-whistleblowers.14  This article concludes that the job duty 
exception is an inappropriate mechanism for determining 
whistleblower cases and that a breach of confidentiality should not 
necessarily preclude attorneys from recovering on otherwise 
meritorious whistleblower claims.15  Moreover, this article 
recognizes the validity of whistleblower claims by in-house counsel 
and recommends a balancing test for determining good faith—an 
issue which, due to its role in the analysis, can alter the way 
whistleblower cases are decided.16 
II. THE LAW AND POLICY OF WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES 
A. Defining “Whistleblowers” 
In order to appropriately discuss “whistleblowers” and the acts 
for which they are named (i.e., “whistleblowing”), it is necessary to 
define the term.  An expansive understanding may designate as a 
whistleblower any employee who “opposes” the conduct, actions, or 
decisions of his or her employer.17  Such a broad explanation is 
 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010). 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 15. See infra Parts IV, V, VII. 
 16. See infra Parts VI, VII. 
 17. Jonathan W.J. Armour, Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad, Whistle?: Minnesota’s 
Recent Trend Toward Limiting Employer Liability Under the Whistleblower Statute, 19 
HAMLINE L. REV. 107, 109 n.13 (1995) (citing DANIEL P. WESTMAN, 
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 19 (1991)) (“In its broadest 
4
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inadequate for the purposes of this article because it fails to 
provide any useful guidance.  A narrow characterization may result 
in something akin to one commentator’s detailed description: 
“someone who, believing that the public interest overrides the 
interest of the organization he [or she] serves, publicly ‘blows the 
whistle’ if the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, 
fraudulent, or harmful activity.”18  Such a specific depiction of 
whistleblowers is too limited for the purposes of this article. 
There exists no single, widely recognized—much less 
universally accepted—definition of whistleblowing.19  However, a 
clear and accurate definition would address four main elements: 1) 
to whom or to what entity a disclosure or whistleblowing report 
may be made;20 2) the nature of the “wrongs” that can be reported 
 
sense, whistleblowing includes employees who oppose their employer's conduct 
either externally or internally.”).  The word “oppose” is so open and ambiguous in 
this context that it could arguably include employees who simply express 
discontent to their co-workers or any other person regarding their employer—or, 
even employees who internally disagree with their employers but never show any 
objective manifestation of their dissent. 
 18. Lofgren, supra note 1, at 316 (quoting RALPH NADER ET AL., 
WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY VII (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  This description 
of a whistleblower is too restrictive because only a few employees would necessarily 
satisfy the first two elements of the definition: 1) that the employee’s underlying 
rationale is that the “public interest” overrides or trumps the organization’s 
interest; and 2) that the employee must “blow the whistle” publicly.  These 
elements preclude purported whistleblowers that either: 1) fail to rationalize their 
actions in terms of the importance of the “public interest” and base their decisions 
on some other standard of conduct (e.g., ethical duties, moral reasoning); or 2) 
fail to make a “public” pronouncement of their employer’s wrongdoing. 
 19. See Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: 
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 640 
(2007) (“[T]here is no single definition of whistleblowing . . . .”). 
 20. There are three main classifications of parties who may receive a report: 
1) internal parties (within the same organization); 2) all external parties (e.g., all 
governmental actors, the media); and/or 3) purely governmental actors with 
authority to investigate, impose sanctions, or otherwise correct the “wrong.”  See, 
e.g., Armour, supra note 17, at 109 (employer or appropriate governmental 
agency); Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will 
Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 
548 (2004) (“higher-ups” within the company, government regulatory agency, 
public interest organization, or the media); John A. Gray, The Scope of Whistleblower 
Protection in the State of Maryland: A Comprehensive Statute Is Needed, 33 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 225, 227–28 (2004) (employer, the press, or enforcement authorities); 
Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy, 25 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 157, 159–60 (2009) (appropriate regulatory agency); Jisoo Kim, 
Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 241 n.1 (2009) (appropriate 
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and qualify as whistleblowing;21 3) the degree to which the 
whistleblower needs knowledge or evidence of the “wrongs”;22 and 
4) the whistleblower’s intent or purpose in making a report.23  For 
the purposes of this article, the following definition will be utilized 
to describe whistleblowers: employees who, in good faith and with a 
reasonable belief that their assertions are accurate, report, disclose, 
or otherwise make known to parties internal or external to the 
organization any violation of law by their employers (or entities or 
persons under the employers’ management and control) for the 




 21. The nature, or type, of “wrong” can vary greatly from vague and subjective 
standards such as conduct “injurious to the public” or “immoral[] or illegitimate 
practices” to clearer, more concrete criteria such as violations of law.  See, e.g., 
Armour, supra note 17, at 109 (“violation of law”); Gray, supra note 20, at 227 
(“injurious to the public”); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1760 (2007) (“illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices”). 
 22. The determination or extent of the purported whistleblower’s requisite 
knowledge may vary from a certain level of subjective belief to actual evidence 
sufficient to convince a reasonable person.  See, e.g., Cavico, supra note 20, at 566 
(good faith, potentially including “absence of malice” and “honesty of intention”); 
Heyes & Kapur, supra note 20, at 159 (“evidence that would convince a reasonable 
person”); Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 643 (“reasonable belief”). 
 23. Intent or purpose may be characterized, if at all, in an infinite number of 
ways.  Some formulations used to describe a whistleblower’s intent or purpose 
include the following: “motivated by notions of public interest”; “to prevent harm 
to others”; or “intention of making information public.”  See, e.g., ROBERTA ANN 
JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 3 (2003) (“intention of 
making information public”); Heyes & Kapur, supra note 20, at 159 (“to prevent 
harm to others”); Kim, supra note 20, at 241 n.1 (“motivated by notions of public 
interest”). 
 24. There are several features of this definition that are particularly 
noteworthy.  First, it requires that alleged whistleblowers act in good faith from a 
subjective point of view and that they have an objectively reasonable belief that the 
underlying allegation is true.  Next, an employee may “blow the whistle” to parties 
inside his or her own organization or any public entity (e.g., government actors or 
the media).  Also, the wrongdoing being disclosed or made known must be a 
violation of law—a standard which is, for the most part, objectively identifiable and 
not subject to the whims or morality of individual employees.  Finally, the 
“purpose” of exposing wrongdoing simply means that the ultimate goal or 
outcome is to make the wrongdoing known to some other party—the underlying 
personal reason or subjective intent for “blowing the whistle” is irrelevant.  This 
definition is widely applicable and generally describes any bona fide whistleblower 
(attorney or non-attorney).  However, there may be additional requirements or 
constraints on an in-house counsel in order to receive whistleblower protection, 
which effectively make the definition of an in-house counsel-whistleblower slightly 
narrower than the general definition employed here.  See infra Part VI.D.2. 
6
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This characterization is sufficiently descriptive to exclude 
purported “whistleblowers” that are actually just dissenters not 
taking any real action and still adequately comprehensive to 
include all of the main groups, or “types,” of whistleblowers.25 
B. Why Protect Whistleblowers? 
Commentators have hypothesized and asserted numerous 
policy reasons for the establishment and perpetuation of 
whistleblower protections.  In order to fully comprehend the 
import of whistleblower statutes, it is essential to examine their 
underlying rationales.  The diverse explanations can be categorized 
into three fundamental justifications.  First, and quite intuitively, 
whistleblower protection promotes legal compliance by 
employers.26  This justification includes the altruistic perception 
that employers simply ought to comply with laws to which they are 
subjected,27 as well as the notion that whistleblowing activity 
encourages compliance, thereby “benefit[ing] the health, safety 
and welfare of the public.”28  In-house counsel frequently engage in 
 
 25. Jonathan Armour divided the “types” of whistleblowers into three 
categories: 1) passive; 2) active; and 3) embryonic.  Armour, supra note 17, at 109 
(discussing the “three main categories within which individual whistleblowers 
fall”).  “Passive” whistleblowers refuse to perform or conspire in illegal activities, 
but fail to report such activities to any authorities (this still constitutes making the 
“wrong” known to an internal party).  Id.  “Active” whistleblowers take some 
“affirmative action” to challenge the impending illegal activity—such “action” may 
be taken within or outside the employee’s organization.  Id.  Finally, “embryonic” 
whistleblowers are employees that were terminated prior to “blowing the whistle,” 
but were intending to do so.  Id. 
 26. Susan J. Spicer, Turning Environmental Litigation on Its E.A.R.: The Effects of 
Recent State Initiatives Encouraging Environmental Audits, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 65 
(1997) (introducing whistleblower laws and noting that one of the fundamental 
goals of such laws are to “promote compliance with the law by the employer”). 
 27. See Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a 
More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1635–36 (2008) 
(discussing the inherent value of employee-whistleblowers to the public at large and 
avoidance of nefarious corporate activity). 
 28. Alexandra Vernoia, The Development of Global Labor Rights—Does New Jersey’s 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act Export Substantive Employment Rights to Workers in 
the Third World?, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 84, 85 (2009) (quoting Feldman v. Hunterdon 
Radiological Assoc., 901 A.2d 322, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)); accord 
John A. Gray, Is Whistleblowing Protection Available Under Title IX?: An Hermeneutical 
Divide and the Role of Courts, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 671, 672–73 (2006) 
(stating that “[w]histleblowers serve to protect public health and safety” and that 
“the public would suffer more injuries in the absence of legal protection for 
whistleblowers”). 
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activities or perform duties that help ensure a company’s legal 
compliance.29  Therefore, whistleblower protections help promote 
or assist in-house attorneys in performing their jobs by providing 
potential safeguards for those who discover and disclose harmful 
information regarding noncompliance. 
Whistleblowers are able to impact large and small employers 
alike for numerous different reasons.  One explanation is that an 
employee stands in a “unique position” to discover and report 
misconduct and wrongdoing by the employer.30  In fact, in-house 
counsel are often in a particularly unique position—e.g., 
gatekeeper, business executive, compliance facilitator31—that 
increases the likelihood of discovery and the need to report 
wrongdoing.  Another possible reason for the impact of employee 
whistleblowing is that employees, and especially attorneys, may be 
able to discourage and dissuade their employers, and fellow 
employees, from engaging in illegal or unethical conduct in the 
first place—that is, before it would become necessary to “blow the 
whistle.”32 
The second category of justifications is premised on 
whistleblower protection that helps avoid alternative outcomes.  If 
there were no whistleblowers,33 the government (and indirectly, the 
 
 29. Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1063–64 (2007) (noting corporate 
counsel’s role in ensuring a Board of Directors’ compliance with its legal and 
equitable duties); Carol E. Dinkins et al., Ethics and Professional Responsibility in 
Environmental Litigation, in A.L.I.-A.B.A., ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1175 (2009) 
(“Lawyers play a key role in helping companies and their officials comply with the 
law and act in the entity’s best interests.”); Duggin, supra note 9, at 1012 
(“Whether or not the formal corporate compliance function reports directly to the 
general counsel, the general counsel and other in-house lawyers play a major role 
in ensuring legal compliance throughout the entity.” (citation omitted)). 
 30. Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 1635. 
 31. See supra notes 4, 6, 9 and accompanying text. 
 32. Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 1635 (“[Employees] can alert employers to 
problems before those problems escalate.  If an employer refuses to resolve an 
issue, employees may be the only parties capable of reporting the problem to 
external authorities.”). 
 33. Purported reasons for nondisclosure (or refraining from whistleblowing) 
are widespread and highly individualized—ranging from personal judgment and 
ethical viewpoint to social pressures and perceptions, organizational mechanisms, 
and retaining employment.  See Armour, supra note 17, at 109–10, 112 (personal 
judgment, social perception, and retaining employment); Robert Jackall, 
Whistleblowing & Its Quandaries, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1133, 1133–35 (2007) 
(ethical viewpoint, social pressure, and institutional difficulties); Kimberly 
Kirkland, Confessions of a Whistleblower: A Law Professor’s Reflections on the Experience of 
Reporting a Colleague, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1105, 1123–24 (2007) (ethical 
8
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taxpayers) would be forced to expend greater resources on 
detecting and investigating illegal activity and corruption.34  Even if 
potential whistleblowers overcome some of their obstacles, they 
would face significant career and financial risk without 
whistleblower protection.35  Therefore, from a public policy 
standpoint, whistleblower protections help prevent at least two 
unfavorable consequences: 1) increased expenditures for 
discovering misconduct; and 2) fewer whistleblowers (or 
individuals with a similar mindset) to begin with. 
The final rationale and many of its derivative arguments are 
founded on an inherent sense of unfairness and injustice that 
would result in the absence of whistleblower protection.  
Essentially, this type of reasoning hinges on the assertion that we 
ought not punish individuals for trying to do the right thing.36  
Furthermore, it is appropriate to protect principled employees, 
including in-house counsel, from adverse employment actions, 
“coerced participation” in illegal, criminal, or unethical conduct, 
and “the danger caused by the underlying [illegal acts].”37  This 
sense of fairness, which underlies the desire to protect individuals 
that “do the right thing,” comports with the moral and legal 
complexity inherent in the job of the in-house counsel, especially 
with respect to the “good cop, bad cop” dichotomy.38 
C. Legal Framework for Whistleblower Protection 
Numerous federal statutes provide varying forms of 
whistleblower protection.  The Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989 (WPA)39 forbids the federal government and any of its 
authorized employees from: 
 
viewpoint and social pressure). 
 34. Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 1636 (“[I]nformation provided by 
whistleblowers can substantially reduce the cost to the public of detection and 
investigation of wrongdoing or corruption.”). 
 35. Gray, supra note 28, at 672–73 (discussing the various rationales for 
whistleblower protection and the impact on employees without such protection). 
 36.  “[I]t is unjust to penalize individuals for reporting what they reasonably 
and in good faith believe to be conduct that is not only unethical and/or illegal 
but also sufficiently dangerous to others, physically or economically, that it must 
be stopped . . . .”   Id. at 673. 
 37. Spicer, supra note 26, at 65. 
 38. See supra Part I; infra Part III.A. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
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tak[ing] or fail[ing] to take, or threaten[ing] to take or 
fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any 
employee or applicant for employment because of—(A) 
any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant 
which the employee or applicant reasonably believes 
evidences—(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, 
or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an 
abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to 
public health or safety.40 
In effect, the WPA proscribes adverse job actions based on any 
employee conduct that may be fairly characterized as 
whistleblowing (e.g., disclosures of illegality or danger to the 
public).  The WPA only protects federal employees; therefore, it 
does not apply to employees of private organizations.41  However, 
many different federal statutes contain whistleblower provisions 
that apply to private employees in certain circumstances.42  Federal 
statutes protecting whistleblowers in private companies are typically 
limited in scope.  Several of the more recent and notable 
congressional acts that afford whistleblowers at least some 
protection include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),43 the 
 
 40. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. § 2302. 
 42. Whistleblower provisions are often included as just one mechanism within 
greater enforcement schemes contemplated in many substantively disparate 
federal statutes.  E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2006) 
(protecting employees that commence or cause to be commenced, testify in, or 
otherwise assist or participate in an action under this Act, which pertains to 
reporting, testing, and other restrictions relating to chemical substances); 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (protecting 
employees that file any complaint, institute or cause to be instituted any 
proceeding, testify in any proceeding, or exercise a right relating to this Act, which 
pertains to the safety of workplace environments and known workplace hazards); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9610(a) (2006) (protecting employees that provide information to the 
government, file, institute or cause to be filed or instituted any proceeding, or 
testify in any proceeding relating to this Act, which established the “Super Fund” 
to organize and administer hazardous waste cleanup efforts); see also The 
Whistleblower Protection Program, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://63.234.227.130/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2011) (explaining the Whistleblower Protection Program). 
 43. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).  Sections 806 and 1107 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) collectively prohibit adverse employment actions against employees of 
public companies that disclose fraudulent activity, as well as criminalize retaliatory 
employment actions based on such disclosures.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(3), 1514A 
(Supp. IV 2004). 
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American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),44 and 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (DFA).45  Some whistleblower provisions specifically apply 
to attorneys—and most often affect in-house counsel.46 
Almost all states have some sort of protection for private sector 
whistleblowers.47  Twenty-eight states have whistleblower statutes 
that, similar to the WPA, only protect “public sector,” or 
governmental, employees.48  Twenty states have whistleblower 
statutes that provide protection for both private and public sector 
employees.49  Forty of the states that have statutory whistleblower 
protection also recognize a common law claim for retaliatory 
discharge as an exception to the employment at-will doctrine.50  
 
 44. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 6 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C, and 47 U.S.C.); see also Ian D. 
Prior & Lisa Skehill, Beware the Federal Government Bearing Gifts: How the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Could Become a Whistleblowing Trojan Horse, 43 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 565, 567 (2010) (“Section 1553(a) of the ARRA prohibits any 
non-federal employer receiving federal stimulus funds from firing, demoting, or 
otherwise discriminating against an employee who undertakes protected action 
under the ARRA.”). 
 45.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C, 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 
U.S.C.); see also Drew A. Harker et al., Whistleblower Incentives and Protections in the 
Financial Reform Act, 127 BANKING L.J. 779 (2010) (discussing various whistleblower 
provisions in the DFA).  One example of whistleblower protection is provided in 
section 922 of the DFA, which prohibits retaliation (e.g., termination or other 
adverse employment actions) against an employee of a public company who 
provides information or assists in an investigation relating to a violation of 
Securities and Exchanges Commission rules or regulations, among other 
violations of law.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004). 
 46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2006) 
(“[R]equiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities 
law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation.”); see also Nicola Laver, 
Revealing the Truth, INT’L B. NEWS, Dec. 2010, at 14, 18 (noting that the 
whistleblower provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act protect some in-house lawyers). 
 47. David Aron, “Internal” Business Practices?: The Limits of Whistleblower 
Protection for Employees Who Oppose or Expose Fraud in the Private Sector, 25 A.B.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 277, 297 tbl. 1 (2010) (indicating that Alabama and Georgia are the 
only “[s]tates without a whistleblower statute for private sector employees or a 
retaliatory discharge cause of action”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  Common law rights and claims, such as retaliatory discharge, certainly 
supplement the statutory whistleblower protections and bolster whistleblowers’ 
litigation efforts against former employers.  While the existence and enforcement 
of common law rights are very important for whistleblowers, they will not be 
discussed in great depth in this article.  The focus of this article is on legislative 
recognition of whistleblower protections as codified in whistleblower statutes and 
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Despite widespread acknowledgement of the need to protect 
whistleblowers, the standards applied and the extent of their 
protection varies greatly.51  Moreover, the outcome of whistleblower 
cases, especially those involving attorneys, tend to be somewhat 
unpredictable.52 
Notwithstanding the diverse statutory and common law 
principles, all of the state approaches, and all plausible alternatives, 
can be classified into one of four conceptual frameworks for 
protecting whistleblowers and deterring employer misconduct that 
would necessitate whistleblowing activity.  The first, and historically 
primary, approach has been based on “retaliation-based 
remedies.”53  Generally, this entails statutory provisions or common 
law rights that amount to a retaliatory discharge cause of action for 
the terminated employee (attorney or non-attorney).54  That is to 
say wrongful discharge claims “traditionally require the plaintiff to 
show that he [or she] was terminated or constructively discharged 
for his [or her] whistleblowing.”55 
Next are the “reward-based” or “incentive-based” models.56  
Quite intuitively, the concept behind this method is to provide 
“financial rewards to individual whistleblowers for their 
disclosures,” thereby promoting the disclosure of employer 
misconduct.57  While it is relatively uncommon for statutes to 
expressly permit such economic incentives, a few federal statutes, 
most notably the False Claims Act,58 have been successful in 
encouraging and compensating whistleblowers for important 
disclosures.59  However, it is highly improbable that any common 
 
the treatment of such statutes by the judiciary. 
 51. See generally id. (showing a table illustrating the great diversity of 
approaches to whistleblower protection adopted by various states). 
 52. Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. 
REV. 786, 797 (2009) (“[T]he results [of attorney-whistleblower cases] are even 
more unpredictable than in cases of non-lawyer whistleblowers.”). 
 53. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the 
Corporate Governance Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 4 (2007) (introducing and describing the three most 
common models of “protecting whistleblowers and promoting the public interest 
their disclosures serve” (citation omitted)). 
 54. Id. at 5–7. 
 55. Id. at 7. 
 56. Id. at 8.  Some colloquially refer to these approaches as “bounty-hunter” 
models.  Id. at 8–9. 
 57. Id. at 9. 
 58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006). 
 59. Tippett, supra note 53, at 9. 
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law or statutory scheme would afford any financial reward for 
attorneys to “blow the whistle,” thereby providing an incentive to 
potentially violate professional and ethical rules (e.g., client 
confidentiality). 
The third type of approach is an incentive-based model 
directed at employers.60  Contrary to the aforementioned “reward-
based” models that remunerate employees for whistleblowing, this 
approach rewards employers for proactively identifying and 
attempting to remedy wrongdoing within their own organizations.61  
The means by which organizations can be incentivized and the 
manner in which employers promote whistleblowing is more 
dynamic and less constrained than in the case of an individual 
whistleblower.  The organizational actions most responsive to 
incentives are the creation or improvement of internal 
investigatory, compliance, and reporting mechanisms, as well as 
systems supporting potential and actual whistleblowers (e.g., 
protecting them from harassment).62  The most prevalent “rewards” 
for employers may include reduced criminal penalties, availability 
of affirmative defenses, and reduced civil liability.63  While in-house 
counsel would not be personally incentivized, attorneys would likely 
be involved in establishing and/or operating the internal feedback 
mechanisms resulting from this approach.64 
The final category consists of “punitive approaches.”65  This 
subset includes an approach known as “mandatory whistleblowing,” 
which imposes liability or other penalties, in specified 
circumstances, on actors that had an opportunity to disclose illegal 
misconduct but failed to do so.66  Statutes providing for such 
liability are “exceedingly rare,” and in many instances “uniformly 
opposed” as contrary to fundamental notions of liberty.67  
Moreover, compulsory disclosure would often contravene many 
 
 60. Id. at 10. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 10–11 (discussing “Employer Incentives for Investigating 
Wrongdoing”). 
 63. Id. at 10.  All of the employer “rewards” are circumstantial, highly fact-
sensitive, and only potentially beneficial to the employer in the proper instances—
in other words, they are not guaranteed.  Id. (noting the judicial uncertainty in 
these matters and the possible standards applied). 
 64. See supra notes 9, 29 and accompanying text. 
 65. Tippett, supra note 53, at 11. 
 66. Id. at 14. 
 67.  Id. at 11–12.   
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professional or ethical duties of attorneys, namely client 
confidentiality.68 
D. The Basics of a Whistleblower Claim 
Before delving deeper into the legal issues implicated by in-
house counsel as whistleblowers, it is useful to understand the 
general components of a claim for whistleblower protection by any 
employee (attorney or non-attorney).  For illustrative purposes, 
consider Minnesota Statutes section 181.932 (hereinafter 
“Minnesota Whistleblower Statute” or “Whistleblower Statute”).69  
The Minnesota Whistleblower Statute prohibits an employer 
(public or private) from discharging, disciplining, or “otherwise 
discriminat[ing]” against an employee because “the employee . . . 
in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any 
federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer 
or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.”70  The 
statute, as supplemented and interpreted by the common law, has 
three main elements: 1) the employee made a report; 2) the 
employee suffered an adverse job action; and 3) there was a causal 
connection between the report being made and the adverse job 
action(s). 
A “report” can generally be described as a communication in 
which an employee “relat[es] or present[s] concerns in an 
essentially official manner.”71  The report “must implicate a 
violation or suspected violation” of the law.72  This “violation of law” 
requirement precludes as a “report,” for whistleblower purposes, 
any communication which only implicates common law violations,73 
internal employer policy infringements,74 or unethical or 
 
 68. See infra Part V. 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2010). 
 70. Id. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1). 
 71. Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of Exam’rs for Nursing Home Adm’rs, 536 N.W.2d 
20, 23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).  Although “essentially official manner” implicates 
some degree of formality, it does not necessarily require a writing.  Buytendorp v. 
Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 826, 834 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 72. Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000).  The violation 
may be of federal law, state law, or rules promulgated pursuant to said laws.  Id. at 
204. 
 73. Nichols v. Metro. Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc., 50 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 
1995) (establishing that internal management problems or “breach” of internal 
policies are not violations of law). 
 74. Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 204 (explaining that breach of contract, a common 
law claim, does not implicate a violation of law). 
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reprehensible conduct (where there is no statute or rule to make 
such conduct illegal).75  Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kidwell, a “report” could not be made by an employee in 
the course of his or her job duties—that is to say, there was a job 
duty exception.76  Finally, a purported whistleblower must act in 
good faith with the purpose of exposing an illegality.77  “Good 
faith” does not extend to protect employees who subjectively 
thought the conduct was unlawful or ought to be unlawful, but in 
fact violated no law (i.e., the facts as reported constituted lawful 
conduct).78  Instead, if an employee reports facts in good faith, the 
question becomes whether those facts, assuming their accuracy, 
constitute a violation of law.79 
All of the aforementioned elements of a whistleblower claim 
apply to the case of an in-house counsel whistleblower.  However, 
an in-house counsel faces further legal, and ethical, issues not 
necessarily explicated by non-attorney whistleblower cases. 
III. KIDWELL AND THE IN-HOUSE WHISTLEBLOWER PROBLEM 
A. The In-House Counsel’s Unique Dilemma 
Most, if not all, whistleblowers were at one point forced to 
make a very difficult decision—one they likely agonized over—
weighing the legal, professional, and ethical implications.  In-house 
counsel, as attorney-employees, undoubtedly struggle with the same 
 
 75. Hedglin v. City of Willmar, 582 N.W.2d 897, 902 (Minn. 1998) (“While we 
find such conduct reprehensible . . . we can find no statute or rule that is violated 
by such conduct . . . .”). 
 76. Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1139 (D. Minn. 2005) 
(“A report that is presented as part of an employee’s job duties is not a report 
under the Act.”); Gee v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 556 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the purported whistleblowing conduct was done “to 
fulfill [job] responsibilities”).  For a discussion of the job duty exception and its 
purported rejection by the Kidwell plurality, see infra Parts III.C, IV. 
 77. See Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202.  For a more detailed explanation of the good 
faith requirement, see infra note 111 and accompanying text and Part VI. 
 78. Kratzer v. Welsh Cos., LLC, 771 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2009). 
 79. Id.  In other words, good faith may potentially permit a whistleblower to 
inaccurately describe the facts or base his or her decision on facts that were not 
absolutely accurate (assuming those facts were obtained and reported in good 
faith).  This good faith distinction invariably reflects a policy decision to protect 
whistleblowers who knew the law correctly and thought (in good faith) that he or 
she knew the correct facts, but not to protect purported whistleblowers who knew 
the correct facts and thought (even in good faith) that they constituted a violation 
of law. 
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tensions.  However, by nature of the legal profession, in-house 
counsel face further complications and greater uncertainty than 
other whistleblowers. 
“The lawyer for an organization . . . is both an agent and a 
fiduciary for the organization—and to it flow all the ethical and 
legal duties a lawyer owes to any client, including the duties of 
loyalty, confidentiality, and competence.”80  Despite the fact that an 
attorney’s legal duties generally mirror his or her ethical duties,81 
an attorney’s decision whether to blow the whistle is riddled with 
complexity, to wit: 
In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due 
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its 
consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer’s 
representation, the responsibility in the organization and 
the apparent motivation of the person involved, the 
policies of the organization concerning such matters and 
any other relevant considerations. While the lawyer’s primary 
obligation is to protect the organization, the lawyer must 
act with caution: [a]ny measures taken shall be designed 
to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of 
revealing information relating to the representation to 
persons outside the organization.82 
Not only are numerous factors to be contemplated and 
arguably—if not inherently—conflicting interests weighed, but 
attorneys also ought to take into account “any other relevant 
considerations.” This unrestrictive language seems to implicate, at 
least potentially, one’s morals and individual principles, among 
other possible deliberations—that is to say, what one considers 
“relevant” is likely to be based upon one’s own ethical viewpoint. 
While consideration of sets of factors as indicia of one 
outcome or another may align directly with the thought process of 
many attorneys, an attorney’s whistleblowing decision is not nearly 
as simple as tallying up all conceivable factors into neat columns 
 
 80. John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations when Representing Organizations, 3 
WYO. L. REV. 581, 613 (2003) (providing an overview of a lawyer’s ethical duties 
when representing an organization). 
 81. See id. at 624–25 (“As a general matter, a lawyer owes every client an 
ethical duty of competence, which ‘requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.’  The 
legal duty is similar.  A lawyer is held to the standard of ‘a reasonable, careful and 
prudent lawyer . . . .’” (citation omitted)). 
 82. Id. at 615 (emphasis added) (citing WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.13(b) (2002)). 
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and conducting an objective cost-benefit analysis.  Instead, an in-
house counsel has at least one major consideration that outside 
attorneys do not have in facing an ethical or legal dilemma caused 
by a client’s misconduct or illegal activity.83  This key deliberation 
has been called an in-house counsel’s “Hobson’s Choice”:84 the 
decision whether to “report on his client’s wrong-doing (thereby 
saving lives, but being fired) or keep quiet (thereby endangering 
lives, but retaining his job).”85  In-house counsel cannot simply 
withdraw from a case or refuse to represent a particular client and 
forego some attorney’s fees; rather, an in-house counsel may have 
to choose between his or her morals and his or her job, thereby 





 83. “Outside attorney,” or “outside counsel,” for purposes of this article, 
refers to any attorney who represents his or her clients solely as an independent 
attorney and agent and is not an employee of any client he or she represents.  For 
a definition of “in-house counsel,” see supra note 3. 
 84. A “Hobson’s choice” is defined as “an apparently free choice when there is 
no real alternative; the necessity of accepting one of two or more equally 
objectionable alternatives.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hobsons+choice?show=0&t=1308532932 (last visited June 
18, 2011) (defining Hobson’s Choice). 
 85. C. Evan Stewart, In-House Counsel as Whistleblower: A Rat with a Remedy?, in 
PRACTISING L. INST., ETHICS IN CONTEXT 2009 145, 148 (2009).  Depending on the 
context of the situation and the nature and severity of the organization’s 
wrongdoing, a whistleblower may or may not be “saving lives.”  However, it is 
relatively clear, and consistently asserted, that whistleblowers do, in fact, have an 
important role in protecting the public and “benefit[ting] the health, safety and 
welfare of the public.”  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 86. At-will employees deciding whether to blow the whistle deal with basically 
the same predicament faced by in-house counsel.  Both are subject to termination 
by their employer and both rely on their employer as their sole (or main) source 
of income and benefits.  See Michael P. Sheehan, Comment, Retaliatory Discharge of 
In-House Counsel: A Cause of Action—Ethical Obligations v. Fiduciary Duties, 45 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 859, 895–96 (1996) (“[In-house] counsel possess nearly all the same 
characteristics of the ordinary at-will employee.”).  Therefore, non-attorney, at-will 
employees generally face the same practical and ethical dilemma as in-house 
counsel when confronted with a whistleblowing decision.  See id. at 896.  However, 
the main distinction between attorneys and non-attorneys in this context is that 
attorneys are subject to professional ethical rules which complicate the decision, 
make the consequences graver, and put in-house counsel in a unique position that 
produces a “more difficult battle.”  Thomas A. Kuczajda, Note, Self Regulation, 
Socialization, and the Role of Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119, 137–38 
(1998) (arguing for increased obligations for law firm partners in enforcing 
ethics). 
17
Banick: Case Note: The "In-house" Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011]  “IN-HOUSE” WHISTLEBLOWER 1885 
Despite the evident complexity of a whistleblowing decision, 
opponents of whistleblower protection assert that in-house counsel 
do not even have a decision to make or a choice in the matter.87  
They essentially claim that it is not even a “Hobson’s Choice” 
because there is no “apparently free choice.”88  Instead, attorneys 
simply have an obligation of utmost loyalty and faithfulness to their 
clients—without regard to any misconduct or illegality—unless 
absolutely required under professional ethical standards.  They 
further maintain that “it would be inappropriate for the 
employer/client to bear the economic costs and burdens of their 
in-house counsel’s adhering to their ethical obligations.”89  Instead, 
as the argument goes, attorneys who have “willingly chosen to enter 
their profession[] should bear these costs and burdens.”90  
Moreover, opponents rely on the history and nature of the legal 
profession to assert that whistleblowing is contrary to the 
fundamental tenets of the profession and that any whistleblowing 
activity represents a “further slide down the slippery slope on which 
[the legal] profession has been riding—away from the ideals of 
zealous client representation, based upon the bedrock principle of 
clients’ absolute confidence in their attorneys’ duty of 
confidentiality.”91 
However deeply rooted in history or fundamental to the legal 
profession, the duty of zealous advocacy is not absolute.  There are 
express and implicit constraints to this duty.  “A lawyer is not 
bound . . . to press for every advantage that might be realized for a 
client.”92  This indicates a necessity for discretion on behalf of an 
attorney and also implies that there are restrictions to the duty of 
zealous representation.93  The outer limits of permissible advocacy 
 
 87. E.g., Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill. 1991) (“In-house counsel 
do not have a choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys 
licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal and unethical demands of their 
clients.  In-house counsel must abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
 88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 89. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 110. 
 90. Stewart, supra note 85, at 148. 
 91. Id. at 153. 
 92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2010) (emphasis added); 
accord MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2008). 
 93. Unfortunately, “[t]he Model Rules do not integrate the limitation on 
zealous advocacy into any rule and thus fail to develop the standard of legal 
conduct for instances in which zealous advocacy may be inappropriate.”  Henry 
Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representation Model: Moderating Power Disparity, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1312 (2003) (arguing for a multiple client representation 
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undoubtedly end where express provisions of professional rules, or 
other laws, govern.94  For example, the duty of zealous advocacy 
does not require, or even permit, an attorney to violate any other 
rules of professional conduct, commit fraud or misrepresentation, 
or engage in criminal acts that “reflect[] adversely on the 
lawyer’s . . . fitness as a lawyer . . . .”95  Therefore, in some 
circumstances, the public interest prevails over an attorney’s duty 
to his or her client.  Similarly, in certain instances, whistleblowing 
by attorneys may produce a greater societal benefit where the 
public’s interest in obtaining information and preventing 
wrongdoing is stronger than the general need for ardent and 
diligent representation of clients.96 
The disparate interests at stake and varying rationales 
implicate personal ethics, legal rules, and professional standards—
many of which consistently conflict with each other.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court recently grappled with these precise 
issues when it decided the case of Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc.97 
 
model in non-litigation practice). 
 94.  Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor and 
Parlor Tricks, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 3, 58 (2002) (“Zealous advocacy does not 
encompass or excuse lawyers’ intentional violations of ethics rules.”).  One 
commentator has even argued that “[a]dherence to the principle of zealous 
advocacy at the expense of all else leads to absurd results.”  Joshua K. Simko, Note, 
Inadvertent Disclosure, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Legal Ethics: An Examination 
and Suggestion for Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 461, 468 (2002) (emphasis added) 
(examining waiver of attorney-client privilege in situations of inadvertent 
disclosure). 
 95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2010) (defining 
misconduct); accord MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2008). 
 96. Rules of professional conduct that limit the scope of diligent 
representation are to some extent analogous to whistleblower statutes because 
both effectively limit or trump the duty of zealous advocacy.  However, there is one 
main distinction: professional rules preclude an attorney from engaging in conduct 
deemed unprofessional or unethical, while whistleblower statutes permit employees 
(including in-house counsel) to take affirmative actions to expose illegality or 
wrongdoing.  Refraining from certain behavior proscribed by professional rules 
may or may not impact a client’s decision to engage in any sort of misconduct.  
Therefore, whistleblower statutes go further by allowing attorneys to divulge 
information relating to wrongdoing, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
another party, internally or externally, will prevent or impede such wrongdoing.  
This is a good example of the complexity and ethical dilemma faced by in-house 
counsel serving as both “good cop” and “bad cop.”  See supra Part I. 
 97. 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010). 
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B. Kidwell Prior to the Supreme Court 
Kidwell is the most recent case in which a state’s highest court 
interpreted a state whistleblower statute or any other state 
whistleblower protections.98  Therefore, Kidwell will be used as a 
reference point for further analysis of matters relating to 
whistleblower statutes.  In particular, the subsequent sections will 
delve into the two critical interpretation issues contemplated in 
Kidwell: 1) the job duty exception; and 2) client confidentiality.99  In 
order to fully analyze these topics, alternative options, and 
recommended solutions or outcomes, it is first necessary to 
understand the Kidwell case. 
1. Facts Giving Rise to Kidwell 
Attorney Brian Kidwell served as in-house general counsel100 
for Sybaritic, Inc. until his employment was terminated in May, 
2005.101  On April 24, 2005, Kidwell sent to Sybaritic’s management 
team an email titled “A Difficult Duty,” (hereinafter “Difficult Duty 
email”) in which Kidwell expressed his concern regarding the 
company’s “pervasive culture of dishonesty” and also identified 
several specific transgressions.102  The email indicated that, if 
Sybaritic and its management team did not mitigate current and 
prevent future misconduct, it was Kidwell’s “intention to advise the 
 
 98. Kidwell was decided on June 24, 2010.  Id. at 220.  The California Supreme 
Court is the only state supreme court that has more recently reviewed a 
whistleblower case—deciding Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. on August 23, 2010.  
237 P.3d 565 (Cal. 2010).  However, in Murray, the court interpreted a federal 
whistleblower statute, not a state statute or other state whistleblower protections.  
See id. at 569. 
 99. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 100. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 223.  As general counsel, Kidwell explained that he 
was “responsible for providing advice on any legal affairs of the company,” which 
included supervising litigation, contract assistance, and employment law issues.  Id. 
at 221.  His employment agreement with Sybaritic described Kidwell’s role quite 
generally: “To assist the President in assuming responsibility and decisions as to all 
corporate legal matters, and the general legal administration of activities at 
Sybaritic.”  Id. 
 101. Id. at 223. 
 102. Id. at 221–22.  In explicating the “pervasive culture of dishonesty,” Kidwell 
described several unethical and illegal acts or omissions by the company, 
including: 1) failure to investigate dishonest salespeople; 2) permitting an 
employee to engage in the unauthorized practice of medicine; 3) failure to pay 
certain taxes; and 4) obstruction of justice, obstruction of a court order, and 
potential Rule 11 sanctions for a failure to disclose “smoking gun” emails pursuant 
to discovery orders in pending litigation.  Id. at 222. 
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appropriate authorities of these facts.”103  Unbeknownst to the 
Sybaritic management team, Kidwell also sent the Difficult Duty 
email to his father, with whom Kidwell had discussed his “ethical 
dilemma.”104  On April 25, 2005, Kidwell met with members of the 
management team and they constructed a plan for resolving the 
issues raised in the Difficult Duty email.105  Three weeks later, 
Kidwell was terminated from his position as general counsel.106  
Sybaritic maintained that Kidwell was not terminated because of 
the content of his Difficult Duty email or the manner in which he 
approached the situation.  Rather, Sybaritic claimed that it 
“experienced a series of problems with Kidwell over the three-week 
period following receipt of the ‘Difficult Duty’ email” and it “could 
no longer trust [him],” especially after discovering the email 
Kidwell sent to his father.107 
2. The District Court Decision 
Kidwell filed suit against Sybaritic claiming it violated the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.108  Sybaritic filed a counterclaim 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.109  After rejecting 
Sybaritic’s requested jury instructions, the district court instructed 
the jury that recovery under the Whistleblower Statute requires 
that: 1) an employee engaged in “protected activity;” 2) the 
employee suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) there was 
 
 103. Id. at 223. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 224.  While sending the Difficult Duty email to his father was a 
purported factor in Kidwell’s termination, this precise event was not concentrated 
on by any of the Minnesota appellate courts.  The fact that Kidwell sent the 
Difficult Duty email to his father is only directly relevant to the claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty.  See infra note 113.  The communication to Kidwell’s father could 
never be construed as protected activity under the Minnesota Whistleblower 
Statute as his father is neither “an employer [nor] a[] governmental body or law 
enforcement official.”  MINN. STAT. § 181.932 subdiv. 1(1) (2008).  Furthermore, 
Chief Justice Magnuson, in his concurrence, discussed only the consequence of the 
breach of fiduciary duty, and not the breaching action itself.  See Kidwell, 784 
N.W.2d at 232–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring).  The courts properly focused on 
the Difficult Duty email Kidwell sent to Sybaritic’s management team and whether 
that discrete activity was protected under the Whistleblower Statute.  See infra notes 
124–37, 141, and accompanying text. 
 108. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 221 (plurality opinion) (alleging violation of MINN. 
STAT. § 181.932 (2008)). 
 109. Id. 
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a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse 
employment action.110  Protected activity is defined as a good faith 
report of a violation of law to the employer or a governmental body 
with the purpose of “blowing the whistle” (that is, with the purpose 
of exposing an illegality).111  The jury found that Kidwell engaged 
in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and 
his reporting of illegal conduct was a “substantial motivating factor” 
in his termination.112  Therefore, the jury found in favor of Kidwell 
and awarded him $197,000, plus fees and costs.113 
3. The Court of Appeals Decision 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals decided that attorneys are 
not per se barred from bringing a claim under Minnesota’s 
Whistleblower Statute, thus Kidwell was properly allowed to 
proceed with his case.114  However, the court held that “an 
employee does not engage in protected conduct under the 
whistleblower act if the employee makes a report in fulfillment of 
the duties of his or her job.”115  The court concluded that Kidwell’s 
 
 110. Id. at 224–25.  The district court’s jury instructions provided, in relevant 
part:  
To recover under the Act, Brian Kidwell must prove . . . he engaged in 
protected activity, he suffered an adverse employment action . . . and 
there was a casual [sic] connection between the protected activity and 
the adverse employment action. 
  “Protected activity” is an employee’s conduct in making a good faith 
report of an actual or suspected violation of a state or federal law to an 
employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official. 
  An employee engages in a protected activity under the Act if the 
purpose . . . was to “blow the whistle” for the purpose of exposing an 
illegality . . . . 
To determine whether a report was made in good faith, you must look 
not only at the content of the report, but also at Mr. Kidwell’s job and 
purpose in making the report at the time the report was made . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 224–25, 227. 
 112. Id. at 225. 
 113. Id.  With respect to Sybaritic’s counterclaims, the district court 
determined as a matter of law that Kidwell breached his fiduciary duty to Sybaritic 
(because of the email Kidwell sent to his father, an individual outside of the 
company), but left the determination of damages to the jury.  Id.  The jury found 
that Sybaritic suffered no damages as a result of the breach.  Id.  Also, the jury 
awarded $2,000 to Sybaritic after finding against Kidwell on the conversion claim.  
Id. 
 114. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 115. Id. at 866 (citing Grundtner v. Univ. of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007); Michaelson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. 
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report of noncompliance was intended “to fulfill the duties of his 
position” and not to “blow the whistle.”116  Therefore, it was not 
protected activity under the Whistleblower Statute and Kidwell 
could not recover.  The court of appeals reversed the district 
court’s decision and found that Sybaritic was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.117 
C. Supreme Court: Kidwell Loses (for Two Reasons) 
1. The Plurality 
In an opinion written by Justice Lori Gildea,118 the three-justice 
plurality focused its analysis on statutory interpretation.119  The 
plurality quickly dismissed the appellate judges’ reasoning by 
holding that “[t]he whistleblower statute does not contain any 
limiting language that supports the blanket job duties exception 
the court of appeals crafted.”120  However, Justice Gildea noted the 
relevance of a purported whistleblower’s job duties in ascertaining 
his or her good faith, which is necessary to establish protected 
activity.121  Justice Gildea analogized the Minnesota Whistleblower 
Statute to the federal WPA.122  Utilizing case law interpreting the 
 
App. 1991)). 
 116. Id.  This finding is the basis for the so-called “job duty” exception. 
 117. Id. at 869–70. 
 118. At the time of the Kidwell decision, Gildea was serving as an Associate 
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Gildea now serves as the Chief Justice of 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.  See Judge Profile: Chief Justice Lorie Skjerven Gildea, 
MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=31&ID=30349 (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 119. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 226–31 (Minn. 2010) 
(framing the issue as the “scope of statutorily-protected conduct” and noting that 
the “analysis [begins] with the language of the statute”). 
 120. Id. at 226.  The supreme court thereby expressly denied the existence of a 
job duty exception to the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 227; see supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 122. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 227–29.  Since the plurality analogized the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute to the federal Whistleblower Protection Act 
(WPA) (which only applies to federal employees), it is noteworthy (even though 
no court has expressly made this analogy) that federal employees can be 
compared to in-house counsel because both actors play dual roles.  A federal 
employee is both an employee and, presumably, a United States citizen, while an 
in-house counsel is both an employee and an attorney.  In both positions, an 
individual has a duty to his or her employer and a “duty,” at least arguably, to the 
public.  This dual nature causes personal moral conflict, as well as legal, 
professional, and ethical implications.  In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States 
Supreme Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to 
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WPA, namely Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management,123 the 
plurality opinion stated that “an employee who has, as part of his 
normal duties, been assigned the task of investigating and 
reporting wrongdoing . . . and, in fact, reports that wrongdoing 
through normal channels is not engaging in protected 
conduct . . . .”124  Based on this rule, the plurality decided that 
Kidwell did not engage in protected activity and, therefore, was not 
afforded protection under the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.125  
The plurality reached this result by concluding that Kidwell failed 
the good faith requirement of the Whistleblower Statute, which was 
described as making a report “for the purpose of blowing the 
whistle, i.e. to expose an illegality.”126  According to Justice Gildea, 
Kidwell’s report was within the scope of his normal job duties;127 his 
 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”  547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  The Court 
avoided a categorical rule, but tied protected speech to the “duties” of a federal 
employee.  In a similar way, the Kidwell plurality claimed to dismiss a per se job 
duty exception, but relied heavily upon Kidwell’s job duties in its decision.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 1422–53. 
 123. 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 124. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 228 (quoting Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1352) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The plurality made it clear that this holding did not 
preclude all employees charged with investigating and reporting wrongdoing from 
engaging in protected activity in all circumstances.  Id.  Such employees could still 
prevail under the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute if: 1) they reported illegality 
“outside normal channels” of communication and reported because the employee 
believed that the normal channels were “unresponsive”; or 2) the report was 
outside the scope of their “normal or assigned job duties.”  Id. at 228–29. 
 125. Id. at 230–31. 
 126. Id. at 227 (quoting Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 
2000)).  The Kidwell plurality described the good faith requirement in a similar 
manner as the district court, considering the same factors to determine good faith.  
Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 227 (“In determining good faith, we consider not only the 
content of the report, but also the employee’s purpose in making the report.”).  
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court tends to focus on the purpose of 
exposing an illegality as the primary, if not sole, indicator of good faith.  See id. at 
227–31; Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202–03.  Therefore, it is accurate to say that the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute demands “good faith,” which in turn requires, 
among other things, a showing that the report at issue was made with the purpose of 
exposing an illegality. 
 127. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 230.  Justice Gildea concluded that, because 
Kidwell was “responsible for providing advice on any legal affairs of the company,” 
he performed his job function when he sent the Difficult Duty email.  Id.  
Additionally, Justice Gildea stated that the Difficult Duty email itself answered the 
question of good faith because it “establishes that Kidwell sent it not to ‘blow the 
whistle,’ but to carry out his job duties.”  Id. at 230 n.9. 
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intent was solely to advise his client;128 and he communicated his 
concerns through “normal channels.”129 
1. The Concurrence 
The outcome of Kidwell hinged on the concurring opinion of 
Chief Justice Eric Magnuson, the sole concurring justice, who 
decided in favor of Sybaritic.130  Notwithstanding his agreement in 
the result, Chief Justice Magnuson reached his conclusion on 
entirely different grounds than the plurality.  In fact, he did not 
once mention the scope or tasks of Kidwell’s employment.131  
Instead, his proposed holding was as follows: “[W]hen a lawyer 
breaches his or her fiduciary duty to the client, the client has an 
absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship.  And 
that right cannot be burdened by any claim from the lawyer for 
compensation or other damages.”132  In other words, if an attorney 
breaches a fiduciary duty (e.g., client confidentiality), he or she 
should be per se barred from protection under the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Statute. 
Chief Justice Magnuson noted that the Whistleblower Statute 
does not expressly provide this exception, but he argued that “the 
statute does not trump [the court’s] power and responsibility to 
regulate the bar, particularly in matters of ethics.”133  Accordingly, 
the concurrence asserted that upon his breach of fiduciary duty 
(determined as a matter of law by the district court),134 Kidwell 
forfeited his right to a claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower 
Statute, and Chief Justice Magnuson cast his vote in favor of 
 
 128. Id. at 230 (relying on the Difficult Duty email, which stated that Kidwell 
only intended to report Sybaritic to the appropriate authorities if the company 
failed to remedy its illegalities, and Kidwell’s testimony, stating that it was his goal 
to “pull [Sybaritic] back into compliance”). 
 129. See id. (“[T]he record establishes that all of the identified recipients of the 
‘Difficult Duty’ email were officials on the management team at Sybaritic with 
whom Kidwell had previously discussed legal matters.”). 
 130. At the time of the Kidwell decision, Chief Justice Magnuson was serving as 
the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Chief Justice Magnuson has 
since resigned and returned to private practice.  Biographies of the Justices of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, MINNESOTA STATE LAW LIBRARY, 
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judgebio.html#magnuson (last visited Feb. 4, 
2011). 
 131. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 231–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 233. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See supra note 113. 
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Sybaritic.135 
2. The Dissent 
Similar to the plurality, the minority (also comprised of three 
justices) focused its analysis on the statutory interpretation of the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute.136  Despite their comparable 
analytical approach, the dissenting opinion not only reached a 
contrary conclusion, but Justice Paul Anderson scathingly rebuked 
the plurality’s reasoning and the outcome of its decision.137  The 
dissent rejected the plurality’s reliance on Huffman (interpreting a 
statute with different language),138 its lack of deference to the jury 
in determining state of mind,139 and its failure to “view[] the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.”140  Under 
the dissent’s construction of the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute, 
a purported whistleblower must show that his or her actions were: 
1) made in good faith; 2) made with the purpose of exposing an 
 
 135. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 233–34. 
 136. Id. at 234–43 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).  “[The court] must consider 
the specific language used in the Minnesota Whistleblower Act . . . and [look] at 
the case law interpreting that statute . . . .”  Id. at 237. 
 137. The dissent used blunt and brazen language to criticize the policy 
judgments, as well as the rationality, of the plurality opinion.  For example: 
• “The plurality has adopted a legal rule that I am unable to reconcile with 
the language of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. . . .  As a consequence, 
the plurality unnecessarily complicates whistleblower law in a manner 
unsupported by the statutory language.”  Id. at 234. 
• “[T]he plurality has not demonstrated why the conclusion reached in 
Huffman applies based on the language of Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act.”  
Id. at 235. 
• “I find no support for the plurality’s adoption of the Huffman test.  
Moreover, I fail to see the wisdom or necessity for the rule advocated for by 
the plurality.”  Id. at 237. 
• “[T]he plurality ignores . . . important principles.”  Id. at 239. 
• “The plurality’s rule is not based in the language of the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Act.”  Id. at 242. 
• The dissenting opinion similarly admonished Chief Justice Magnuson’s 
concurrence: “[T]he concurrence . . . cho[se] to ignore the language of 
[the] statute in this case. . . .  [A]s we have said many times, ‘[i]t is the duty 
of this court to apply the law as written by the legislature.’”  Id. (citing Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 68 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009)) (noting that Chief Justice Magnuson wrote the 
International Brotherhood opinion for a unanimous court) (last alteration in 
original). 
 138. Id. at 235. 
 139. Id. at 238. 
 140. Id. at 240. 
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illegality, or “blowing the whistle”; and 3) “not merely routine.”141 
IV. KIDWELL ISSUE 1: JOB DUTY EXCEPTION 
A. The Issue 
The plurality in Kidwell purported to refute and proscribe any 
per se job duty exception under the Minnesota Whistleblower 
Statute.142  However, its opinion seems to create a test that, 
although not categorical, will very rarely, if ever, protect employees 
charged with monitoring or reporting compliance or other legal 
issues.  Several commentators have opined that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found no protection for Kidwell specifically because 
his actions directly carried out his job duties, despite the plurality’s 
alleged denial of any such exception.143  The plurality stated that an 
alleged whistleblowing report that is made “outside normal 
channels” or “outside the scope of the employee’s normal or 
assigned job duties” could still be protected.144  The dissent very 
clearly opposed not only the plurality’s reasoning, but also the 
consequence of its decision: 
 
 
 141. Id. at 239 (“[E]ven when an employee has an obligation to make a report 
because of his job duties, that report should be protected if . . . the employee is 
able to prove the report was not merely routine but, instead, was made in good 
faith with the contemporaneous purpose of ‘blowing the whistle.’”).  The 
dissenting opinion asserted a different standard for proving good faith because 
“an employee’s job duties or the particular channel through which the employee 
makes his report” should not be dispositive on the issue of the employee’s 
subjective intent (i.e., good faith).  Id. at 237. 
 142. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 143. FREDERICK T. GOLDER & DAVID R. GOLDER, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: 
COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 1:149 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the holding in 
Kidwell: “[a] former in-house attorney did not engage in conduct protected by the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Act . . . [because he] made the report to management in 
fulfillment of his job responsibilities”); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Current Developments 
in Employment Law: The Obama Years, Retaliation Update—Supplemental Materials, in 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE 
OBAMA YEARS 1371, 1371 (2010) (describing the Kidwell decision: “the in-house 
lawyer did not engage in conduct protected by the state whistleblower statue 
because the lawyer was fulfilling the responsibilities of his position of 
employment”); Gail O’Gradney, In-House Attorney’s Conduct Not Protected by 
Whistleblower Act, FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2010, at 2 (introducing Kidwell 
as a case in which “an in-house attorney did not engage in conduct protected by 
the whistleblower statute because he was fulfilling his employment 
responsibilities”). 
 144. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 229–31. 
27
Banick: Case Note: The "In-house" Whistleblower: Walking the Line Between
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011]  “IN-HOUSE” WHISTLEBLOWER 1895 
The plurality appears to indicate that only in a very rare 
case would an employee who is responsible for reporting 
illegal conduct and who reports such conduct through 
normal channels, be able to prove that the report was 
made for the purpose of exposing an illegality.  I 
disagree. . . . 
. . . . 
[E]ven when an employee has an obligation to make a 
report because of his job duties, that report should be 
protected if, but only if, the employee is able to prove the 
report was not merely routine but, instead, was made in 
good faith with the contemporaneous purpose of 
“blowing the whistle.”145 
The polarity of viewpoints with respect to the proper analysis 
of the Whistleblower Statute, as well as the practical outcome, is 
indicative of divergent policy judgments without a clearly superior 
result.  In fact, one commentator claims that the alleged job duty 
exception is “[p]erhaps the most provocative and unsettled 
doctrine involving whistleblowers.”146 
B. The Existence and Rationale of the Exception 
Generally speaking, it is accepted by federal courts that a job 
duty exception (or, if not so labeled, an exception to the same 
effect) applies to the federal WPA.147  However, some courts have 
 
 145. Id. at 238–39 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting). 
 146. Marshall H. Tanick, Blow the Whistle, Sound the Drum: Marking the 20th 
Anniversary of Minnesota’s Whistleblower Law, 63 BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 22 (2006). 
 147. See, e.g., Sarah Wood Borak, The Legacy of “Deep Throat”: The Disclosure 
Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No Fear Act of 
2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 633 (2005) (citing Huffman v. Office of Personnel 
Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (“[T]the WPA does not protect 
whistleblowing to co-workers in the normal course of job duties.”); Yuval Feldman 
& Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, 
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1167 
(2010) (citing cases from five different federal circuits) (“[V]arious courts 
interpreting the federal Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) have developed 
similar ‘job duty’ exceptions that exclude protection when a disclosure is made in 
the ordinary course of an employee’s duties.  In other words, under the ‘job duty’ 
defense, employees who report illegality within the scope of their work duties are 
not protected from retaliation.” (citations omitted)); Orly Lobel, Citizenship, 
Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 
433, 448 (2009) (citing cases from six different federal circuits) (“[C]ourts 
interpret the Act to exclude protection when disclosure is made pursuant to the 
defined job duties of an employee.  In other words, under the ‘job duty’ defense, 
employees who report illegality within the scope of their work duties do not 
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refused to recognize the exception, even with regards to the WPA, 
and dismiss it claiming there is “no significant policy served by 
extending whistle-blower protection only to those who carry a 
complaint beyond the institutional wall, denying it to the employee 
who seeks to improve operations from within the organization.”148  
This dissent from some federal courts is evidence of tension in an 
ostensibly well-settled doctrine. 
At the state level, whistleblower statutes and their respective 
interpretations vary greatly,149 despite the fact that a vast majority of 
states have enacted whistleblower statutes.150  Sixteen states have 
requirements regarding a whistleblower’s state of mind: ten states 
“[r]equire [a] good faith belief . . . that workplace conduct violates 
a statute, regulation, or rule” and six states “[r]equire [a] 
reasonable belief . . . that workplace conduct violates a statute, 
regulation, or rule.”151  These requirements relating to subjective 
intent are a major reason for the job duty exception (where it 
exists).  The exception has been characterized as a presumption 
that an employee, based on his or her job duties, does not possess 
the requisite state of mind (i.e., good faith) to qualify as a 
whistleblower.152  Therefore, the job duty exception is a procedural 
mechanism for discarding whistleblower claims that are deemed to 
be meritless because of the inherent inability to prove good faith.  
This alleged inability is based only on the fact that the purported 
whistleblower reports wrongdoing and misconduct as a normal part 




receive protection from retaliation.” (citations omitted)). 
 148. Marques v. Fitzgerald, 99 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Lobel, supra 
note 147, at 449 (explaining that, despite its common acceptance, “some courts and 
regulators have rejected the ‘job duty’ defense” (emphasis added)). 
 149. Rubinstein, supra note 19, at 643 (“State whistleblower laws differ on 
many points including the appropriate recipient of the whistleblower report, the 
subject of protected whistleblowing, the motive of the whistleblower, the required 
quality of evidence of wrongdoing, and the remedies available for the 
whistleblower.”). 
 150. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 151. Aron, supra note 47, at 297 tbl. 1. 
 152. Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys, 
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043, 1045 n.10 (2008) (“Where an employee's job duties 
require an employee to expose illegality, there is a presumption under Minnesota 
law that the employee's purpose in making the report was to further the 
employer's interest, not to expose illegality.” (emphasis added)). 
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“The rationale for [the job duty] rule is that when employees 
perform their job duties, they act to promote their employers’ best 
interests, rather than to expose illegality.”153  In essence, employing 
the job duty rule indicates that the exception is the best manner to 
determine (or disprove) an employee’s good faith in engaging in 
whistleblowing conduct.154  This value judgment regarding the 
method for establishing (or disproving) good faith reflects a court’s 
policy preference regarding matters such as judicial economy,155 
fairness or merit of the outcome,156 the public good (at least, to the 
extent that it is impacted by the alleged violations of law),157 and 
protection of potential whistleblowers who act in good faith.158 
C. The Detriments of the Exception 
Courts employing the job duty exception (or reasoning akin to 
it) likely favor this approach to resolving state of mind issues 
because it provides a bright-line rule—thus, taking the conjecture 
 
 153. William Jordan, In-House Attorneys May Recover From Their Employers for 
Violations of Minnesota Whistleblowers Statute, PROF. LIAB. REP. (West), July 2008, at 5. 
 154. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. 2010) (noting 
that an employee’s job duties help answer the question of the employee’s purpose 
in making a report, thereby also helping to resolve the issue of good faith). 
 155. Using an evidentiary presumption to shift the burden of proof greatly 
impacts judicial efficiency and speed, both of which are important considerations 
given scarce (or finite) judicial resources.  Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy 
Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1307, 1336 (2010) (“An underlying reason for 
creating the presumption is to promote judicial economy.”). 
 156. A presumption recognizes an alleged fact before any direct evidence of 
that fact is produced.  Therefore, utilizing a presumption suggests confidence that 
it accurately exhibits the “fact” attempting to be proven (in this case, that an 
employee’s performance of his or her job duties is indicative of his or her real or 
actual intent not to “blow the whistle”).  Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family 
or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-
Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, 1100 (1996) (“Presumptions are 
based on the logical probability that the existence of one fact renders another fact 
to be true. . . .  [T]he root of the presumption . . . is the nexus of probability: when 
one fact is true, the other usually follows.”). 
 157. Employing this particular presumption reflects a judgment as to the 
public good insofar as the presumption discourages whistleblowing and/or harms 
the public good that is to be protected by whistleblowers. 
 158. Hearing on Private Sector Whistleblowers Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and 
Labor and the H. Subcomm. on Workforce Prots., 110th Cong. 33 (2007) (statement of 
Richard E. Moberly, Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of 
Law) (“[I]t is simply too easy for good-faith whistleblowers to fall through the gaps 
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out of determining good faith.159 However, one of the 
disadvantages of the job duty exception—like most bright-line 
rules—is that it is too broad.160  The definition of whistleblowing 
inherently necessitates a fact-sensitive inquiry regarding good faith, 
among other elements.161  Therefore, whistleblower claims are not 
well-suited for a broad presumption such as the job duty exception, 
which cannot adjust to the fact-intensive nature of the conduct at 
issue. 
Alternatively, the job duty exception and analogous analyses 
are problematic because they generate an improper distinction 
between internal and external reporting—that is, different legal 
ramifications for “blowing the whistle” to parties inside or outside 
the organization.  This distinction comports with the Kidwell 
plurality opinion, which affords an employee (whose job requires 
investigation or reporting of misconduct) whistleblower protection 
if reports are made “outside the normal channels” or “outside the 
scope of the employee’s normal or assigned job duties.”162  As a 
result, employees have incomparably greater motivation to 
circumvent internal reporting mechanisms entirely and “blow the 
whistle” directly to external entities, including governmental law 
enforcement agencies.163  This “create[s] a perverse incentive 
 
 159. See Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“Whenever 
possible, . . . judges generally should adopt clear, bright-line rules . . . .”); see also 
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlement in Antitrust and 
Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1075 (2002) (“Judges 
generally find it more convenient to apply bright-line rules . . . .”). 
 160. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards; Elusive 
Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 137 (1991) (“A bright line rule necessarily cuts 
too broad a swath.”). 
 161. Hearing on Private Sector Whistleblowers, supra note 158, at 37; see also Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 60 N.R.C. 160, 189 (2004) (“Whistleblow[er] . . . cases are, by their 
nature, peculiarly fact-intensive and dependent on witness credibility.”), supra note 
24 and accompanying text (explaining definition of “whistleblowing” adopted for 
purposes of this article). 
 162. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 228–29 (Minn. 2010). 
 163. Jenny Mendelsohn, Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A Comparison of 
British and American Responses to Internal and External Whistleblowing, 8 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 723, 729 (2009) (highlighting the “perverse incentive” 
created by a distinction between internal and external whistleblowing); Sarah F. 
Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss in the Free Speech Right of Public Employees Under 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 369, 370 (2008) (describing the same 
incentive for using “improper channels”); see Lobel, supra note 147, at 445–46 
(noting that different jurisdictions treat the internal-external distinction 
disparately, and with different practical implications).  Depending on the 
applicable whistleblower statute, the only external entities to whom an employee 
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whereby employees might bypass their employer-specified channels 
of resolution and voice their concerns in public . . . .”164 
Finally, absent specific knowledge of employment, and 
particularly whistleblower, law and its potential ramifications, it is 
highly unlikely that an employee whose tasks include reporting 
noncompliance would ever escape a job duty exception.165  It is 
doubtful that such an employee would ever go “outside normal 
channels” (to use the Kidwell plurality’s language) because it is 
precisely his or her job to report “inside” the normal channels.  It is 
equally improbable that such an employee would encounter 
wrongdoing “outside the scope” of his or her job as the duties 
explicitly entail monitoring and reporting such wrongdoing—
which leaves the argument that any wrongdoing discovered is 
always within the scope of his or her duties.166  The latter issue is 
exceptionally troublesome, as was the case in Kidwell, if the 
purported whistleblower is in-house counsel, who is likely to be 
responsible for all legal problems and noncompliance that occur 
within a company167—thereby, essentially creating a categorical rule 
for in-house counsel if the job duty exception is applied.  
Consequently, it is unduly burdensome and risky for employees—
attorneys or non-attorneys—to engage in whistleblowing activity in 
 
may “blow the whistle” are governmental actors, while others could conceivably 
permit disclosure to alternate third parties, including the media.  See, e.g., MINN. 
STAT. § 181.932 (2008) (limiting the permissible external parties to “any 
governmental body or law enforcement official”). 
 164. Mendelsohn, supra note 163, at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The job duty exception’s external reporting incentive is “perverse” because it 
“penalize[s] well-intentioned employees who attempt to rectify wrongdoing,” as 
well as promote the public good by exposing crime and facilitating law 
enforcement.  Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1991).  
Furthermore, internal reporting (which is disincentivized under the job duty 
exception) has other potential benefits besides exposing illegalities, including, but 
not limited to: getting to the “root” of the cause quickly; preventing wrongdoing 
before it harms others; and the possibility for fundamental shifts in the way 
businesses view compliance and self-regulation.  See Sinzdak, supra note 27, at 
1635–36 (“They can alert employers to problems before those problems escalate. . 
. .  The presence of whistleblowers may also help deter misconduct in the first 
instance.”); see also supra Part II.B (discussing how employees can impact decisions 
by their employers and co-workers to engage in illegal or unethical conduct). 
 165. Even Kidwell, an attorney, was unable to ensure his protection after 
researching whistleblower law.  See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 223. 
 166. See id. at 221 (relying on evidence that Kidwell was responsible for “any 
legal affairs of the company” and “all corporate legal matters” to determine the 
report was within the scope of his job duties). 
 167. Id. 
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jurisdictions where a job duty exception exists. 
D. Replacing or Modifying the Job Duty Exception 
Based on the aforementioned defects, applying the job duty 
exception is an improper interpretation of whistleblower statutes 
with a flawed outcome.  For jurisdictions that do not subscribe to a 
job duty exception, or any similar analysis, there is no problem.  
Similarly, there is no dilemma for jurisdictions seeking to prohibit a 
job duty exception (as the Kidwell plurality purported to do); they 
need only a “simple” common law or statutory exclusion.  For 
jurisdictions battling with a job duties rule, there are several other 
ways to overcome the downfalls of the doctrine while retaining its 
few benefits.168 
One approach is to rely on the judiciary to rectify any 
problems the job duty exception has raised.  Courts may interpret 
the exception more narrowly so as to bar fewer whistleblowers from 
a remedy for what they thought was, and what could very plausibly 
be, protected conduct.  Instead of relying on an employee’s “job 
duties” to exclude a purported whistleblower from showing the 
requisite state of mind, courts could permit the finding of good 
faith where an employee’s whistleblowing activity is “not merely 
routine”169 or does not occur within his or her “essential job 
function.”170  Alternatively, courts may embrace the fact-sensitive 
nature of whistleblower cases and employ a “balancing” test that 
takes into account many considerations.171  The factors would 
certainly include an employee’s job duties, but job duties would not 
be dispositive, or in any way determinative, on the issue of good 
faith or the whistleblower claim as a whole.172 
 
 
 168. See supra Parts IV.B, C. 
 169. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 239 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting) (arguing 
that employees should be protected as whistleblowers anytime their whistleblowing 
activity is “not merely routine”). 
 170. Jamie Sasser, Comment, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for 
Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 775–79 
(2007) (arguing for the application of the “essential job function” standard in lieu 
of the “job duty” standard). 
 171. In theory, this approach may have been advocated by the Kidwell plurality, 
but its opinion failed to implement this type of balancing as its analysis hinged 
almost exclusively on Kidwell’s job duties in determining his lack of intent to be a 
whistleblower.  See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 227–31 (plurality opinion). 
 172. See infra Part VI. 
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Another manner in which a jurisdiction could effect change 
regarding a disfavored job duty exception is through state or 
federal legislation.  One “simple” option is to make whistleblower 
statutes more clear and explicit about what activities are and are 
not considered protected conduct.  An example of this statutory 
framework exists in New Jersey, where the “Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act . . . defines inclusively the activities that 
may give rise to whistleblower protection.”173  Conceptually, this 
construct is appealing because it greatly reduces ambiguity, reduces 
compliance costs (and risk of noncompliance), and increases 
predictability in the law.  This approach seems simple on its face, 
but it will only be attained with great legislative difficulty in 
delineating those individuals and those activities that are statutorily 
deemed to be protected.  However, if the barriers are overcome, 
this statutory method may provide legislatures greater control over 
whistleblowing law by allowing for less interpretation.174 
A different legislative approach is to retain or permit the 
common law job duty exception but obviate one of its worst policy 
implications—the incentive to “blow the whistle” directly to outside 
parties.175  This option hinges on statutory duties to make internal 
reports regarding the wrongdoing or noncompliance before ever 
seeking to “blow the whistle” externally.  Under such a statute, in 
order for a whistleblower to receive protection, he or she must 
report wrongdoing inside the organization and give it an 
opportunity to correct the misconduct.176 
As is evident, there are sufficiently diverse means by which 
courts and legislatures can define whistleblower protections, 
exclude meritless claims, and retain the desired flexibility without 
resorting to a broad and unnecessary job duty exception. 
 
 173. Aron, supra note 47, at 292 (emphasis added) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:19-3 (West Supp. 2009)). 
 174. However, this framework results in a statutory version of a bright-line rule, 
which could create some problems, notwithstanding the clarity and attempted 
precision.  See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 163–176 and accompanying text. 
 176. Ten states currently have similar statutes that require internal reporting 
and an opportunity to correct noncompliance or wrongdoing.  Aron, supra note 
47, at 297 tbl.1 (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio). 
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V. KIDWELL ISSUE 2: CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. The Issue 
In Kidwell, the issue of client confidentiality seemed more like 
a footnote to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, as both the 
plurality and dissent focused almost exclusively on statutory 
interpretation and the role of the purported whistleblower’s job 
duties.177  However, Chief Justice Magnuson’s concurrence decided 
the outcome of the case, thereby determining whether the plurality 
or dissenting views would “win” the job duties debate.  More 
significantly though, the concurrence raised another issue of 
particular importance: the relevance and consequences of client 
confidentiality for attorney-whistleblowers.178 
 
 177. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 221.  The ethical rule at issue in Kidwell, and all 
attorney-whistleblower cases, is Model Rule 1.6, which states: “A lawyer shall not 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client” except in limited 
prescribed circumstances.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).  That 
is to say, the issue is one of client confidentiality, not attorney-client privilege.  
While both doctrines have similar policy underpinnings, and often similar results, 
they are discrete principles with correspondingly disparate scopes and functions.  
Jason Popp, Current Development, The Cost of Attorney-Client Confidentiality in Post 
9/11 America, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 875, 876–77 (2007) (explicating the 
distinctions between the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege).  
It is important to note the distinction because they “often are used 
interchangeably” and the “confusion is perpetuated by the courts and attorneys.”  
Kristi Belt, Proceedings of the Conference on Emerging Professional 
Responsibility Issues in Litigation, Recommendations of the Working Group on 
Confidentiality and the Limits of Attorney-Client Privilege, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 33 
(1999) (presenting solutions to address problems of confidentiality and the 
attorney-client privilege); Irving D. Labovitz & William J. Labovitz, Attorney-Client 
Privilege in Individual Bankruptcy Cases . . . An Emerging Oxymoron?, 104 COM. L.J. 
301, 302 (1999) (discussing attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy cases).  The 
duty of confidentiality is a professional ethical rule that prohibits an attorney from 
disclosing to others any information related to the representation of a client—a 
broad scope.  Popp, supra note 177, at 876 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2007)).  On the other hand, attorney-client privilege is a 
rule of evidence that applies in the case of “compelled testimony”—which is a 
narrower scope—and only protects confidential communications between an 
attorney and client.  Id. at 876–77.  Since there is no issue of compelled testimony 
in Kidwell, or most other whistleblower cases, and the matter relates only to client 
information, this article focuses on the duty of client confidentiality. 
 178. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring). 
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B. The Existence and Rationale of Confidentiality 
The notion that client information should not be disclosed 
and ought to be protected as confidential has existed for hundreds 
of years.179  However, the actual duty of client confidentiality was 
not contemplated until close to the mid-1800s.180  In 1908, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) adopted its Canons of 
Professional Ethics, which provided that attorneys had an 
obligation “not to divulge [a client’s] secrets or confidences.”181  
When the ABA approved its Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility in 1969, it continued to recognize the “ethical 
obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets 
of his [or her] client.”182  The most commonly asserted rationale for 
attorney-client confidentiality has been succinctly stated in a “three-
step syllogism”: 
First, for the adversary system to operate, citizens must use 
lawyers to resolve disputes and the lawyers must be able to 
represent clients effectively.  Second, attorneys can be 
effective only if they have all the relevant facts at their 
disposal.  Third, clients will not employ lawyers, or at least 
will not provide them with adequate information, unless 
all aspects of the attorney-client relationship remain 
secret.  Thus, the systemic argument goes, attorney-client 
confidentiality is the foundation of orderly and effective 
adversarial justice.183 
 
 179. Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New and Emerging Telecommunications 
Technologies: A Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 39 HOW. L.J. 437, 455 
(1996) (explaining that doctrines related to attorney-client privilege arose during 
the 1500s out of “consideration for the oath and the honor of the attorney”); 
Popp, supra note 177, at 876 n.8 (noting that the attorney-client privilege 
originated at least as early as 1654). 
 180. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 129 & n.8. 
 181. Id. at 130; see also Charles M. Bennett, Frontiers in Ethics: The Estate Lawyer’s 
Duty of Loyalty and Confidentiality to the Fiduciary Client, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 807, 
815–16 (2007) (reprinting and discussing several canons that relate to client 
confidentiality).  The Canons were amended in 1928 to expressly include a “duty 
to preserve his client’s confidences.”  FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 130. 
 182. Bennett, supra note 181, at 820.  The ABA continues to appreciate the fact 
that “full knowledge of the facts by the lawyer is essential to proper 
representation.”  FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 133 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 183. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358 
(1989) (explaining the justifications for confidentiality). 
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The temporal longevity alone indicates the significance of the 
doctrine in the legal profession generally.  However, 
“[c]onfidentiality in an advisory setting is extremely important in 
the corporate atmosphere.”184  For in-house attorneys, the 
significance (and almost sanctity) of confidentiality seems to 
directly conflict with the fact that attorneys are strictly prohibited 
from engaging or assisting in client misconduct.185  Some courts 
interpret this tension as producing a single “choice” for in-house 
attorneys: withdraw from representation of the client (i.e., resign 
his or her position within the company).186  The existence and 
extent of the duty of confidentiality would not be problematic if in-
house attorneys had an actual “choice,” which included the 
possibility of whistleblowing with subsequent protection.  Yet, 
extending whistleblower protection to in-house counsel presents its 
own set of unique problems.  “The most notable of these problems 
involves the divulgence of client confidences . . . .”187 
It is precisely this divulgence, or breach of client 
confidentiality, that the Kidwell concurrence attempted to 
safeguard against.  In the concurrence, Chief Justice Magnuson 
argued for the “traditional” approach to attorney-whistleblowers—
that is to say, there is no protection.188  This approach is generally 
premised on two policy justifications: 1) whistleblower protection 
would directly undermine client confidentiality and interfere with 
candid communications (the fundamental reason for protection of 
 
 184. Todd John Canni, Protecting the Perception of the Public Markets: At What 
Cost? The Effects of “Noisy Withdrawal” on the Long Standing Attorney-Corporate Client 
Relationship, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 371, 374 (2004) (discussing the development of 
the attorney-corporate client privilege). 
 185. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); see also Stephen C. Dillard, When Principles Clash: The 
In-House Counsel as Renegade or Whistleblower, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 210 (1996) 
(“[L]awyers are bound by ethical codes not to participate in client misconduct . . . 
.”); supra text accompanying note 95. 
 186. See Dillard, supra note 185, at 210–11 (describing several decisions where 
courts have disallowed whistleblower protection for attorneys). 
 187. Brett Lane, Comment, Blowing the Whistle on Balla v. Gambro: The 
Emergence of an In-House Counsel’s Cause of Action in Tort for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 235, 236 (2004–05) (discussing the problems of extending the tort of 
retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel). 
 188. Chief Justice Magnuson introduced his analysis with a quote from Justice 
Cardozo stating that “[m]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with 
conditions.”  Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 232 (Minn. 2010) 
(Magnuson, C.J., concurring) (alteration in original). 
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client confidences); and 2) whistleblower protection is simply 
unnecessary because attorneys are already bound by the ethical 
duties of their profession, which adequately protect the public 
interest.189  Chief Justice Magnuson based his argument on the 
relative importance of the policy underpinnings of client 
confidentiality: “[s]ound public policy principles underlie the 
whistleblower statute, but those public policy principles do not 
trump the public policy behind the fiduciary obligations [including 
the duty of confidentiality] that lawyers owe to clients.”190 
The concurrence further reasoned that because clients have 
an “absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship” 
under Minnesota law—regardless of any actual damage or breach 
of fiduciary obligations—an attorney has no right to compensation, 
no claims for other legal recourse, and no right to breach client 
confidences upon termination of said relationship.191  Therefore, it 
would be inappropriate to offer attorney-whistleblowers any 
statutory or common law protection when “blowing the whistle” 
violates client confidentiality.  In fact, the concurrence claimed 
that, based on ethical rules, any attorney who breaches such 
fiduciary obligations “forfeit[s] any right” to recover any damages 
or compensation.192  Finally, the concurrence argued that a 
contrary holding would simply be “a further slide down the slippery 
slope” degrading the attorney-client relationship and its 
concomitant confidentiality.193 
Despite any alleged trend eroding fundamental tenets of the 
attorney-client relationship, there has always been, and will 
continue to be, a consideration of the public interest—which was 
the basis for professional rules in the first place.  An attorney’s duty 
to his or her client is not unfettered by the public interest and an 
attorney’s duty to the public as a whole.194  Whistleblower statutes, 
 
 189. Kim T. Vu, Note, Conscripting Attorneys to Battle Corporate Fraud Without 
Shields or Armor? Reconsidering Retaliatory Discharge in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 209, 216 (2006) (“[I]f courts grant in-house attorneys the right to 
sue their employers for retaliatory discharge, employers might be less forthright 
and candid with their attorneys. . . .  [A]n attorney's professional rules of conduct 
adequately safeguard the public policy of protecting the public interest.”). 
 190. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232. 
 191. Id. at 233–34. 
 192. Id. at 233. 
 193. Id. at 234.  This “slippery slope” is, in part, related to the historical 
importance of the attorney-client confidentiality.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 179–181. 
 194. One commentator keenly observed: 
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in general, are a recognition that in certain instances the public 
interest must prevail over an employee’s duty of loyalty (e.g., 
confidentiality) to his or her employer.195  Similarly, there are likely 
to be instances in which the public interest overrides even the in-
house counsel’s duty of confidentiality to his or her client and 
employer. 
C. The Proper Impact of Confidentiality 
The Kidwell dissent refuted Chief Justice Magnuson’s 
concurrence mainly on grounds of statutory interpretation—
namely, that it failed to interpret the plain language of the 
Whistleblower Statute, which contains no provision excepting 
attorneys from protection.196  The merits of the dissent’s argument, 
although interesting, are less important than the underlying 
questions: whether the claims of the Kidwell concurrence are 
grounded in sound legal reasoning and, in turn, whether attorney-
whistleblowers ought to be afforded legal protection. 
As previously discussed, there are always problems with 
categorical or bright-line rules.197  This per se bar for attorney-
whistleblowers who, in the purported act of whistleblowing, breach 
client confidences is no different. 
The Kidwell concurrence based most of its analysis on the 
ethical obligations of attorneys, including the duty to refrain from 
disclosure of confidential information.198  Yet, Chief Justice 
 
This obligation to the public, although perhaps not articulated as clearly 
as the obligation to a client, is present in the codes of ethics that govern 
attorneys and judges.  Furthermore, the idea that attorneys have a duty to 
the public that may be just as important as the duty to zealously defend 
their clients’ interests gains currency within the profession every day. 
Katherine Sullivan, Letting the Sunshine In: Ethical Implications of the Sunshine in 
Litigation Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923, 931 (2010) (describing duties that 
attorneys owe to the public at large); see also Patrick T. Casey & Richard S. 
Dennison, The Revision to ABA Rule 1.6 and the Conflicting Duties of the Lawyer to Both 
the Client and Society, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 569, 582 (2003) (“[T]he legal 
profession places great emphasis on both the attorney’s duty to the client and to 
society.”).  For another example of the interaction between the public interest and 
professional rules, see supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relationship between whistleblowing and the duty of zealous advocacy). 
 195. See Cavico, supra note 20, at 635 (asserting that the “general duty” of 
loyalty and confidentiality “can be superseded by special circumstances,” due in 
part to moral or ethical constraints). 
 196. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 242–43 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting). 
 197. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232–33 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring). 
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Magnuson noted: “The [ABA] Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility has expressed its opinion that a lawyer 
may disclose confidences in order to establish a whistleblower claim 
against a former client.”199  The concurrence subsequently 
downplayed—and arguably ignored—this statement, asserting only 
that it does not provide attorneys “complete freedom” to reveal 
client confidences.200  However, the lack of “complete freedom” to 
disclose confidential information certainly (and logically) does not 
foreclose the possibility of whistleblower protection which is 
expressly permitted by ABA ethical rules.  This analysis relates only 
to the disclosure of confidential information in the course of 
establishing a whistleblower claim, but does not directly determine 
the underlying issue of whether an attorney is barred from even 
bringing a claim if said attorney first breaches client confidentiality.  
While this issue is not directly resolved by the ABA allowance of 
attorney-whistleblower claims, the result is implied.  In order to 
“blow the whistle,” an attorney inherently has to breach, to some 
extent, the required confidentiality.  Therefore, permitting a 
whistleblower claim is impliedly allowing such a claim following a 
breach of client confidences.  Any contrary conclusion would 
negate the explicit language and intent of the ABA with respect to 
authorization of attorney-whistleblower claims. 
Chief Justice Magnuson’s other primary argument was that 
whistleblower law should not “trump” ethical rules of the legal 
profession.201  The concurrence further explained that 
whistleblower doctrines and ethical duties were both founded on 
sound public policy principles.202  This explanation is clear 
evidence of conflicting policy interests.  Where a conflict exists 
between two or more crucial public policies, there should be no 
per se rules—or, in the words of Chief Justice Magnuson, one 
should not categorically “trump” the other.203  As a supplementary 
policy argument, it has been asserted that “[c]ourts declining to 
extend [whistleblower protection] to attorneys on the theory that 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 233.  Attorney-whistleblowers lack “complete freedom” because, 
according to the ABA, they can only “reveal information to the extent necessary to 
establish [a] claim” and must take “reasonable affirmative steps . . . to avoid 
unnecessary disclosure and limit the information revealed.”  ABA Comm. on Ethics 
and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001). 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 190. 
 202. See supra text accompanying note 190. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 190. 
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[it] would undermine attorney-client confidentiality may be failing 
to see the obvious.  It is possible that extending [whistleblower 
protection] to in-house counsel could actually encourage 
corporations to conduct their affairs ethically and in accordance 
with the law.”204 
A major shortcoming of Chief Justice Magnuson’s argument 
for the “traditional” view of attorney-whistleblowers is that it 
completely failed to acknowledge any distinction between in-house 
counsel and outside attorneys.205  The interactions between in-
house counsel and their clients cannot be characterized solely as an 
attorney-client relationship, but must be viewed as an employer-
employee relationship as well.206  The latter relationship is so 
prevalent that “the elements of client trust and attorney autonomy 
are less likely to be implicated.”207  The employment context of in-
house counsel is sufficiently different to question not only whether, 
in certain circumstances, a breach of confidentiality may be 
permitted under ethical rules, but also whether in-house counsel 
start with a reduced standard of confidentiality.208  Consequently, 
 
 204. Lane, supra note 187, at 241.  This analysis goes one step further: 
[Courts] recognize[] that lawyers are governed by ethical standards 
which “are . . . linked by their nature and goals to important values 
affecting the public interest at large.”  Accordingly, though counsel’s 
claim for [whistleblower protection] may be tangentially beneficial to 
counsel, it serves as the necessary encouragement to advance the 
fundamental public policies inherent in an attorney’s adherence to his 
ethical code as opposed to his silent conformance with illegitimate 
employer demands. 
Id. at 242 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 498 
(Cal. 1994)). 
 205. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 231–34 (Minn. 2010) 
(Magnuson, C.J., concurring); see also supra Part III.A (discussing the unique 
circumstances of an in-house counsel and how the role is distinguished from 
outside attorneys). 
 206.  Christopher G. Senior, Does New York’s Code of Professional Responsibility 
Force Lawyers to Put Their Jobs on the Line? A Critical Look at Wieder v. Skala, 9 
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 417, 442–43 (1992) (discussing a prior Minnesota Supreme 
Court case and quoting the court: “[T]he in-house attorney is also a company 
employee, and we see no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employer-
employee relationship if this can be done without violence to the integrity of the 
attorney-client relationship.” (quoting Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 
N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1991)) (alteration in original)). 
 207. John R. Webb & J. Chris Kinsman, Wrongful Discharge Suits by In-House 
Counsel: Refining the General Dynamics Standard, 11 LAB. LAW. 35, 43 (1995) 
(quoting Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502). 
 208. Sally R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes Between In-House Attorneys and 
Their Employer-Clients: Much Ado About Nothing—or Something?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
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in-house counsel do not fit into the “typical” attorney-client 
paradigm.  However, Chief Justice Magnuson’s concurrence 
assumed the contrary209—a supposition that resulted in an inferior 
analysis and result. 
D. Whistleblowers Not Barred by a Breach 
Compelling public policy interests underlying whistleblower 
protection,210 permission to bring whistleblower claims under ABA 
ethical standards,211 and the unique circumstances of in-house 
counsel make improper a categorical prohibition against 
protection for attorney-whistleblowers who breach fiduciary 
obligations, such as client confidences.  “At a minimum . . . 
attorneys should not be treated less favorably than non-attorneys in 
similar jurisdictions for purposes of [whistleblower protection].”212  
Instead of treating the breach of confidentiality as a dispositive 
finding of fact which determines the outcome, courts should use a 
breach of confidentiality as a factor to contemplate in the greater 
whistleblower claim. 
VI. BALANCING TEST FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 
There is no question as to whether an attorney, including in-
house counsel, can be a whistleblower—at least in some instances—
and receive the attendant protections.  The Kidwell plurality 
explicitly stated that an employee whose job duties include 
investigating and reporting wrongdoing could be a whistleblower, 
thereby providing a possibility for protected conduct even within a 
job duty analysis.213  Moreover, the ABA has shown its approval of 
 
483, 528–29 (1997) (explaining that outside lawyers may try to convince clients 
that sensitive matters should be referred outside the company because of “the 
possibility that in-house attorneys may not be held to the same standards of 
professional conduct as outside lawyers”; noting that there may be “a problem for 
in-house clients [as to] whether they are going to use in-house counsel for 
anything sensitive”). 
 209. All of the case law cited in the Kidwell concurrence to support Chief 
Justice Magnuson’s legal analysis and arguments involved outside attorneys, not in-
house counsel.  Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 232–34. 
 210. See supra Part II.B. 
 211. See supra notes 198–199 and accompanying text. 
 212. Long, supra note 152, at 1098–99. 
 213. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 228 (plurality opinion).  However, the Kidwell 
plurality’s possibility for protection for employees charged with such job duties is 
quite narrow.  It would only protect such employees if they made a report “outside 
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protection for attorney-whistleblowers.214  Therefore, the crucial 
question is: under what circumstances can an in-house counsel be a 
whistleblower? 
A. Problems with Bright-Line Tests 
Notwithstanding its purported rejection of a job duty 
exception,215 the Kidwell plurality focused its analysis almost 
exclusively on the scope and nature of Kidwell’s job duties.216  In 
the Kidwell concurrence, Chief Justice Magnuson concentrated 
entirely on Kidwell’s breach of client confidentiality.217  
Consequently, both the plurality and concurrence essentially 
reduced the whistleblower claim—which requires a necessarily 
complex set of questions—into a single inquiry (job scope and 
fiduciary duties, respectively).218  Instead, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court should have employed a balancing test that took into 
account all, or most, of the relevant evidence, facts, and 
circumstances to determine the critical issue of good faith.  Such a 
test would have undoubtedly included consideration of Kidwell’s 
job duties and fiduciary duties.  This type of test allows for a more 
nuanced analysis, especially with respect to statutory interpretation 
and professional responsibility, and, in turn, better legal decisions. 
When facing a statutory whistleblower claim, a court’s main 
objective should be to interpret the statute and apply the law to the 
facts in the case.219  As a result, a court should base its analysis in the 
language, requirements, and constraints of the applicable statute.  
 
normal channels” or outside the scope of their “normal or assigned job duties.”  
Id. at 228–29.  Nevertheless, the plurality recognized the possibility, albeit limited, 
for attorney-whistleblowers to engage in protected conduct.  Id. 
 214. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 130–139. 
 218. A whistleblower claim necessitates a complex set of questions because, 
according to Minnesota Whistleblower Statute and the definition adopted for 
purposes of this article, there are numerous elements relating to the purported 
whistleblower’s conduct and state of mind (i.e., good faith), as well as professional 
duties in the context of attorney-whistleblowers.  See supra notes 24, 70–79, and 
accompanying text. 
 219. See Mathew Paulose Jr., Note, United States v. McDougald: The Anathema 
to 18 U.S.C. 1956 and National Efforts Against Money Laundering, 21 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 253, 301 (1997) (“The first rule of statutory interpretation is for a court to give 
effect to the plain meaning of a statute’s language.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 
645.08(1) (2010) (explaining that “words and phrases are construed according to 
rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage”). 
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Under the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute, once the basic 
elements of the whistleblower claim are proven (e.g., a “report” was 
made which caused an adverse employment action), the threshold 
issue becomes the purported whistleblower’s state of mind—that is, 
whether the report was made in good faith with the purpose of 
exposing an illegality.220 
As discussed above, the analyses utilized by the Kidwell plurality 
and the Kidwell concurrence both hinge on one major factor.  The 
plurality adopted a relatively bright-line rule to ascertain a 
purported whistleblower’s state of mind (i.e., good faith),221 while 
the concurrence created a categorical rule that obviates the need to 
consider state of mind altogether.222  Each approach presents a 
fundamental problem.  The Kidwell plurality’s reliance on job scope 
and communication channels did not effectively determine good 
faith.  It used two potential indicators without inquiring into either 
Kidwell’s subjective state of mind or what state of mind could be 
reasonably (objectively) inferred given the facts.  Therefore, the 
plurality was unsuccessful in fully revealing Kidwell’s good faith (or 
lack of good faith), and accordingly failed to properly apply the 
Whistleblower Statute.  On the other hand, the Kidwell concurrence 
completely ignored the statutory language and circumvented the 
need to discuss the threshold issue of good faith by excepting 
attorneys who breach fiduciary duties (e.g., client confidentiality) 
from the statute’s purview, without any statutory grounds to do 
so.223  Consequently, the concurrence also failed to properly apply 





 220. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. 2010) 
(identifying the issues of good faith and purpose as the “central question”); supra 
notes 111, 126 and accompanying text; see also Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 
196, 202 (Minn. 2000) (requiring a good faith report made with the purpose of 
exposing an illegality).  The issue may be considered “threshold” to the extent that 
it is, at this point in the analysis, likely the only remaining issue between a 
successful claim (i.e., whistleblower protection) and an unsuccessful one. 
 221. See supra text accompanying note 126. 
 222. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 196. 
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B. Value of a Balancing Test 
Unfortunately, presumptions and categorical rules are unfit 
for determining state of mind.224  The Kidwell plurality effectively 
presumed a lack of good faith based on job duties and/or 
communication channels and the concurrence created a per se bar 
from whistleblower protection based on a breach of fiduciary duty.  
Therefore, both opinions failed to answer the central question 
regarding Kidwell’s good faith and, as a consequence, did not 
properly determine the outcome in Kidwell.  If the Minnesota 
Supreme Court had instead applied a test whereby it balanced 
numerous factors to determine Kidwell’s state of mind, it would 
have reached a more appropriate conclusion—regardless of 
whether that conclusion would have been the same or different.225 
A balancing test would account for the complexity of an in-
house counsel’s role in the organization, the difficulty and 
ambiguity of an in-house counsel’s decision to “blow the whistle,” 
and the fact-sensitive nature of whistleblower claims generally.  
Also, the perverse effect of a bright-line rule regarding scope of job 
duties and communication channels may be ameliorated by a 
factors-based test that provides more leniency and flexibility based 
on the individual circumstances of the case.  Furthermore, the 
main advantage of a bright-line rule is to infuse predictability into 
the law in order to permit attorneys and non-attorneys alike to 
conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with the law.  
Because whistleblower claims by nature are somewhat 
unpredictable,226 utilizing a balancing test will not unduly reduce 
the predictability (or lack thereof) in whistleblower cases.  
Moreover, an in-house counsel whistleblower claim is not a 
 
 224. Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Negotiating and Drafting the Agreement to Arbitrate in 
2003: Insuring Against a Failure of Professional Responsibility, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
271, 275 (2003) (emphasizing that when courts apply presumptions to determine 
intent there is an “obvious risk that the court’s presumptions could be an 
inaccurate portrayal of, or even adverse to, the parties’ original intent”); Michael 
P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of 
Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 63 (1996) (noting the risk of 
inaccuracy in determinations of intent when relying on presumptions). 
 225. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s failure to take into account all of the 
necessary evidence to determine Kidwell’s good faith, as needed to apply the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute, does not necessarily mean that it reached the 
wrong result, but merely that its analyses were not nearly as effective or convincing 
as they could have otherwise been. 
 226. See supra note 52. 
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problem that implicates only the rights of two private parties 
(where categorical rules are stronger), as an attorney owes duties 
not only to his or her client, but to the public as well.227  Finally, it is 
inappropriate to use bright-line or categorical rules where there are 
closely competing public policy interests, such as those implicated 
by in-house counsel whistleblower claims.228  In his concurrence, 
Chief Justice Magnuson made it clear that no area of law or public 
policy should “trump” another with respect to an in-house counsel 
whistleblower.229 
C. Balancing Factors to Determine Good Faith 
Having discussed the relative value of a balancing test 
generally, it is appropriate to contemplate some of the factors 
which ought to be balanced.  It is necessary to reiterate that these 
factors should only be considered in making a determination 
regarding the threshold issue of good faith.  The other elements of 
a whistleblower claim are more straightforward and less critical—
thus, the balancing test is just one part of the overall analysis in a 
whistleblower case.230  Consideration of good faith is likely to occur 
after all of the basic elements (e.g., report, adverse employment 
action, and causation) have already been proven. 
Conceptually, the good faith question has two distinguishable 
components: 1) whether the purported whistleblower made the 
report with the purpose of exposing an illegality (which is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to satisfy the good faith requirement); 
and 2) the broader issue of good faith (which includes, among 
other things, the whistleblower’s purpose).231  However, analytically, 
these two components can be contemplated at the same time and 
with the same evidence because both good faith and the purpose of 
 
 227. See supra notes 92–96, 194 and accompanying text. 
 228. Competing policy interests include, but are not limited to, upholding the 
employment-at-will doctrine, protecting private organizations’ proprietary 
information, safeguarding against public harm, promoting employees to represent 
the public interest (and potentially their individual morality), and sustaining the 
structure and significance of the attorney-client relationship. 
 229. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 232–33 (Minn. 2010) 
(Magnuson, C.J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 201–203 
(explaining that whistleblower law should not trump ethical rules). 
 230. However, the balancing test ought to be a focal point in a whistleblower 
claim because state of mind is so fundamental in the character of the claim; yet, it 
does not supersede or replace the overall whistleblower analysis. 
 231. See supra notes 111, 126, 220 and accompanying text. 
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exposing an illegality are matters of state of mind—that is, 
determining the whistleblower’s subjective goal in “blowing the 
whistle.”  They are best analyzed using a balancing test—utilizing, 
among others, the factors described below—to determine whether 
the purported whistleblower acted in good faith with the purpose of 
exposing an illegality.232 
The factors taken into account, and their relative weight, will 
likely vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the specific facts 
and circumstances at issue.  Nevertheless, it is possible to identify 
some discrete factors among the multitude of plausible 
considerations.  The following table contains a non-exhaustive list 
of possible factors that may contribute to a court’s finding that a 
report was made in good faith with the purpose of exposing an 
illegality 
 Factors militating in 
favor of a report made 
in good faith with the 
purpose of exposing 
an illegality 
Factors militating in 
favor of a report NOT 
made in good faith 
with the purpose of 
exposing an illegality 
Employee’s job duties Report itself was 
outside the normal 
scope of job 
responsibilities; 
manner in which 
report was 
investigated, created, 
or communicated was 
not ordinary or 
routine; report was a 
one-time task or event 
Report itself was within 
the scope of job 
responsibilities; 
manner in which 
report was 
investigated, created, 
or communicated was 
normal and ordinary; 
report was a 
continuous or 
recurring task 





outside normal chain 
of command; reported 
to more and/or different 
superiors than 
ordinary matter 
Within the normal 
channels of 
communication; inside 
the normal chain of 
command; reported to 
the same superiors as 
ordinary matters 
 
 232. Abstractly speaking, the standard “in good faith with the purpose of 
exposing an illegality” would answer the question posed in the first paragraph of 
Part VI: Under what circumstances can an in-house counsel be a whistleblower?  
Practically speaking, however, the actual circumstances would be determined by 
employing the balancing test and factors described in this Part. 
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Content of the report Clearly implicated a 
violation of law 
Alluded to, but did not 
expressly implicate, a 
violation of law or 
discussed only a 
potential illegality 
Timing of the report Timing was of no 
particular 
consequence 
Timing itself caused a 
material benefit to the 
whistleblower or a 
substantial detriment 
to the organization 
Impetus for “blowing 
the whistle” 
Motivation based on 
individual morality, 
service to the public 
good, innate sense of 
fairness, or any other 
motive that does not 
directly benefit the 
whistleblower  
Ulterior motivation 






More egregious illegal 
activities may 
necessitate greater 
flexibility or leniency 
for the whistleblower 
because the public’s 
interest in stopping or 
preventing such 
conduct increases 
Less egregious illegal 
activities may not merit 
any flexibility or 
leniency for the 
whistleblower, and 
may indicate an 
ulterior motivation or 
bad faith by the 
whistleblower 
Likelihood another 
employee would have 
“blown the whistle” 
If it is unlikely other 
employees knew of the 
illegality or were 
unlikely to report the 
illegality, it may 
necessitate greater 
flexibility or leniency 
for the whistleblower 
because of his or her 
unique position 
If it is likely that other 
employees knew of the 
illegality or were likely 
to report the illegality, 
it may not merit any 
flexibility or leniency 
for the whistleblower 
because he or she was 
not in a particularly 
unique position 
Extent to which 
whistleblower 
attempted to remedy 
the situation prior to 




significant efforts by 
the whistleblower to 
internally avert, 
mitigate, or otherwise 
prevent any harm 
resulting from illegal 
activity (before and/or 
Little or no effort to 
remedy the illegality 
internally before 
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after conduct became 
illegal) 
Amount and/or 
accuracy of evidence 
or knowledge the 
whistleblower 
possessed  
Actual knowledge of 
illegality and/or 
substantial evidence 
proving the existence 
of illegal conduct 
Mere speculation or 
conjecture based on 
minimal objective 
evidence (e.g., based 
on rumor or third-
party reports) 
Breach of fiduciary 
duty (i.e., client 
confidentiality) 
Disclosure or manner 
of disclosure did not 
violate any fiduciary 
duties to the client 
Disclosure or manner 
of disclosure violated 
fiduciary duties to the 
client 
Extent and effect of 
any breach of fiduciary 
duty 
Minor breach with 
respect to the amount 
or magnitude of 
information disclosed; 
little or no resulting 
harm to the client 
Major breach with 
respect to the amount 
or magnitude of 
information disclosed; 
moderate to 
significant harm to the 
client 
 
Under this balancing framework, both the job duties and 
breach of fiduciary duty analyses—which the Kidwell plurality and 
concurrence relied on, respectively—would be subsumed into a 
broader analysis of good faith, where neither factor would be 
dispositive or unduly determinative.  The more comprehensive 
analysis can more appropriately determine the purported 
whistleblower’s state of mind—a threshold issue—and therefore 
can more accurately interpret and apply the language of the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Statute. 
D. Application of the Balancing Test 
1. Applying the Test in Kidwell 
Kidwell’s claim satisfied all of the basic elements required for 
whistleblower protection.  The email certainly constituted a 
“report,” Kidwell was terminated (an adverse action), and the jury 
decided there was a casual connection between the two events.233  
Therefore, as the plurality noted, the fundamental issue in Kidwell 
was whether Kidwell acted in good faith with the purpose of 
 
 233. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 220, 225. 
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exposing an illegality.234  At this point, it is necessary to employ the 
balancing test to determine the critical state of mind issues, and 
ultimately the appropriate outcome in the case. 
There are good arguments that Kidwell’s report was made as 
part of his job duties—namely, that he was charged with providing 
advice on any or all legal matters.235  But there is a legitimate retort 
that it was outside his job duties—reporting the noncompliance 
with discovery orders was a duty of the outside counsel, which 
Kidwell voluntarily assumed.236  Sybaritic would also argue that 
Kidwell made the report within the normal channels of 
communication and inside the ordinary chain of command as he 
sent the Difficult Duty email to most of the management team, with 
whom Kidwell worked closely.  However, Kidwell would point out 
that he had never before notified the entire management team 
about any legal issue, but rather typically communicated with one 
or two individuals.237  Therefore, the report was outside the normal 
channels of communication and chain of command.  Sybaritic may 
assert that the Difficult Duty email did not implicate a violation of 
law as its main goal was to alert the management of the “pervasive 
culture of dishonesty.”238  However, this particular argument will fail 
because, while the whole email did not implicate violations of law, 
several specific allegations of illegality were contained in the email.  
There was no issue regarding the timing of the Difficult Duty email 
nor was there any evidence of an ulterior motive besides Kidwell’s 
desire to comply with his moral and professional obligations.239 
While Sybaritic’s alleged illegalities caused no resounding 
harm to the public, false allegations in pleadings, noncompliance 
with discovery orders, and charges of obstruction of justice can 
hardly be considered “minor” offenses.  Moreover, Kidwell learned 
of these violations in his position as in-house counsel, so it is 
unlikely any other employees would have a sufficient basis to “blow 
the whistle.”240  Therefore, Kidwell was in a unique position 
 
 234. Id. at 227. 
 235. See id. at 221. 
 236. Id. at 241–42 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting). 
 237. Id. at 223 (plurality opinion). 
 238. Id. at 240 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting). 
 239. See id. at 221–22 (plurality opinion) (noting Kidwell’s “deep regret” for 
having to write the email in accordance with his personal and professional duties). 
 240. Although unlikely, Sybaritic could conceivably argue the outside counsel 
knew, or suspected, the illegality.  Id. at 241 (Anderson, J. Paul, dissenting).  
However, if this argument was raised, it would fail because the outside counsel 
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amongst his fellow employees.  Although Kidwell threatened to 
alert the “appropriate authorities” of the illegalities, it was clear 
that he was attempting to remedy the problem internally as he first 
sent the Difficult Duty email to the management team (before 
disclosing the illegalities to the authorities) and met with the 
management to establish an action plan to resolve the legal 
problems.241  Furthermore, Kidwell had strong evidence of the 
illegality and it was based on his personal knowledge and 
interactions within his position as in-house counsel.  Finally, 
Kidwell did, in fact, breach his fiduciary duty to Sybaritic; however, 
the jury determined that no damages were caused by the breach.242 
Upon considering the aforementioned factors, the court 
should have found that Kidwell possessed the proper state of mind 
to receive whistleblower protection—that is to say, Kidwell made 
the report in good faith with the purpose of exposing an illegality.  
The arguments relating to job duties and communication channels 
were roughly equal on both sides, or, at least, neither materially 
outweighed the other.  The breach of fiduciary duty, although not 
causing any damage, militates in favor of a lack of good faith due to 
the seriousness of any such breach.  However, almost all of the 
remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of a finding of good faith.  
Because the purpose of the balancing test is to take into account 
the specific facts and totality of the circumstances (although, not 
necessarily with equal weight), it is evident that under such an 
approach Kidwell would have been deemed to have acted with the 
requisite state of mind.  Since his good faith was the sole remaining 
issue in the case, Kidwell would have succeeded in his overall claim 
and been afforded protection under the Minnesota Whistleblower 
Statute. 
2. In-House Counsel, Generally 
While the goal of the balancing test is to account for a wide 
variety of highly diverse sets of facts, there are some generalizations 
that can be made as to the applicability of whistleblower 
protections in the context of in-house counsel.  When applied to 
 
could not be a whistleblower because he or she was not an employee, so that 
knowledge does not impact the factor relating to the likelihood of another 
whistleblower within the organization. 
 241. Id. at 223. 
 242. Id. at 225. 
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in-house counsel, the balancing test will generally produce a 
smaller subset of whistleblowers than the definition provided for 
purposes of this article.243  That is to say, the circumstances under 
which an in-house counsel will likely have the requisite state of 
mind (i.e., good faith) to satisfy a whistleblower statute is narrower 
than the group of individuals that would otherwise fall into the 
category labeled “whistleblowers” for general purposes in this 
article. 
Typically, an in-house counsel would need to “blow the 
whistle” internally—at least initially.  If terminated upon an 
internal report or upon a later external report, the in-house 
counsel may be eligible for whistleblower protection.244  This 
probable requirement recognizes the importance of the attorney-
client relationship, and client confidentiality more specifically.  
This process would permit an in-house counsel to first look after 
the client’s interests while fulfilling his or her professional duties, 
and then serve the public interest if, or when, any alleged 
illegalities fail to be rectified.  Furthermore, an in-house counsel 
would likely fail to receive protection if he or she “blew the whistle” 
and disclosed client confidences to the media because that would 
be an egregious breach of confidentiality likely to result in 
significant undue harm to the client.  Therefore, an in-house 
counsel would ultimately have to inform a relevant governmental 
actor if the legal problems persisted.245 
Generally, the allegations of wrongdoing would have to be a 
violation of law.  Permitting an in-house counsel to breach his or 
her fiduciary duties to the client (without giving up whistleblower 
protection) for anything less than a violation of law (e.g., merely 
“immoral conduct”) would disproportionately favor the public’s 
interest in preventing the specific harm, as compared to the 
public’s interest in maintaining a strong attorney-client 
relationship.  Since an in-house counsel is a trained attorney, he or 
 
 243. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 244. The obvious issue is how long an in-house counsel must wait after an 
internal report before he or she could justifiably “blow the whistle” externally and 
still maintain whistleblower protections.  The period of time would likely be that 
which is reasonable under the circumstances.  Beyond that likely standard, it 
would be a factual question. 
 245. However, an in-house counsel would likely lose any whistleblower 
protection if he or she informed a governmental actor of illegality before “blowing 
the whistle” inside his or her own organization or taking any other steps to remedy 
known or suspected violations of law. 
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she may be likely to be held to a slightly higher standard of 
knowledge of the law.  In effect, good faith may not mean merely 
making a good faith report of the facts,246 but also a good faith 
effort to ascertain the applicability and avert the consequences of 
any alleged illegalities.  Finally, like all whistleblowers, an in-house 
counsel must intend to make known or expose the violation of law.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned generalities, courts would 
apply the balancing test and contemplate the impact of all of the 
factors to determine the critical issue of good faith.  No single 
factor would be either determinative as to the protection afforded 
or a categorical bar to protection.  The previously discussed 
generalizations oversimplify the considerations, but provide a sense 
of “weight” that may be attributed to certain particularly germane 
factors. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whistleblower statutes, and whistleblower law more generally, 
are intended to promote legal compliance, thus benefiting the 
public interest by providing protection for employees that risk their 
reputation and livelihoods to “blow the whistle.”247  However, this 
public policy goal is complicated by the unique circumstances and 
concerns of in-house counsel who operate within a “good cop, bad 
cop” dichotomy that exists in the nature of their roles within their 
organizations.248  An internally divisive paradigm exists not only in 
relation to an in-house counsel’s company, but also with respect to 
an attorney’s duty to the public at large.249  That is to say, conduct 
that may be beneficial to an individual in-house counsel (e.g., 
keeping one’s job) may be detrimental to society (e.g., permitting 
perpetuation of public harms by failing to “blow the whistle”), with 
 
 246. Cf. supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that in a non-
attorney whistleblower case, “good faith” may not require that the facts be entirely 
accurate, but rather that the purported whistleblower—knowing the appropriate 
law—thought the facts constituted a violation of law and made a good faith report).  
Once again, the standard may be one of reasonableness—likely, the knowledge 
and prudence of a reasonable attorney under the circumstances.  Therefore, if 
under this standard, an in-house counsel was simply wrong about the law or failed 
to appropriately apply the law to the facts, he or she would not be likely to satisfy 
the “elevated good faith” requirement, and consequently would not obtain 
whistleblower protection. 
 247. See supra Part II. 
 248. See supra Parts I, III.A. 
 249. See supra notes 92–96, 194 and accompanying text. 
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the converse likely being true as well.  Kidwell illustrated the 
difficult decisions made by in-house attorneys, and the equally 
difficult judgments required by courts interpreting whistleblower 
statutes as they relate to in-house counsel.250 
By analyzing the legal reasoning and policy arguments, it 
becomes clear that the job duty exception to whistleblower statutes 
is unwarranted and unnecessary as other methods exist to better 
determine valid claims without the negative policy implications.251  
Furthermore, breach of client confidentiality should not result in a 
categorical bar to attorney-whistleblower claims because a proper 
analysis would show due respect and deference to conflicting 
public policy judgments and appropriate statutory interpretation.252  
Issues relating to both job duties and breach of client confidences 
ought to be decided as part of a more comprehensive balancing, or 
factor-based, test used to determine the state of mind of in-house 
attorney-whistleblowers.253  Flexible, fact-sensitive inquiries are far 
more appropriate than categorical rules due to the complexity of 
the considerations and practical implications for in-house counsel 
faced with a potential decision to “blow the whistle.”  The 
application of a balancing test would assist in thorough statutory 
interpretation by more accurately determining good faith, thereby 
producing superior legal and practical outcomes. 
 
 250. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 251. See supra Part IV. 
 252. See supra Part V. 
 253. See supra Part VI. 
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